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Executive Summary 
This paper explores how Egyptian, Kenyan, Serbian and South African civil society 
organisations (CSOs) use communication and relationships with media to engage in 
democratic contestation. Individual interviews were conducted with 91 CSO members who 
participated in the various democratisation conflicts OLVWHG LQ 0H&R'(0¶V UHVHDUFK GHVLJQ. 
Qualitative analysis was then used to look at how the activists perceived the importance of 
the media, their efforts to get media coverage, their perceptions of the quality of media 
coverage of the conflict, and the importance of social media in their activism around these 
conflicts. Finally, this paper covers the interviewees¶ perceptions of democracy and how the 
conflicts relate to theLUFRXQWU\¶V democratic dispensations. 
x The study found that key sources of conflict identified by the interviewees 
included group identity (e.g. religious and ethnic identity) and contestations 
around notions of citizenship.  
x Interviewees also identified the distribution and control of power was another key 
source of conflict - Egyptian, Serbian and South African activists all placed 
significant importance on networked civil society. Thus, communications among 
members and with the outside world was key to redistributing power.  
x However, KeQ\D¶V&62s saw their power as stemming from the ability to build 
healthy relationships between different groups of people, and so the primary 
communication activities centred on citizen education.  
x Egyptian, Kenyan and Serbian activists viewed regular elections as a key marker 
of democracy, and the media was correct to focus on such issues. But South 
African activists suggested that the media focussed too much attention on 
elections, and not enough given to local participatory mechanisms of listening to 
citizens.  
Across all four countries regular elections, the existence of civil society, and its 
representation in the media, were not necessarily seen as enough to guarantee stable 
democracies. While the media provided some space and coverage of civil society activities, 
CSOs in all countries felt that the media often played a detrimental role in democracy, either 
by superficial coverage, or by flagrantly highlighting conflict in a way that increased 
polarisation. Therefore, CSO activities ± including their communication activities - could be 
seen as contesting identity and citizenship, contesting the state, and contesting the media. 
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Introduction 
This paper explores how Egyptian, Kenyan, Serbian and South African civil society 
organisations use communication and relationships with media to engage in democratic 
contestation. The communications practices of civil society organisations (CSOs), the 
representation of civil society groups in the media and the way they use the media to achieve 
their goals are the central points of research interest in this paper. This research is part of a 
bigger project, which looks at the same conflict through various small studies and includes 
content analysis of media coverage of each conflict, interviews with journalists about how 
they covered the conflict, interviews with civil society role players, interviews with 
government and government communicators, and a twitter analysis of selected conflicts. 
In each country different conflict cases were examined, focusing on the role played by 
civil society actors and particularly the communication and media practices of CSOs 
connected with the various conflicts. In section 2 the paper will explore how to define CSOs, 
but for now the variety of organisations covered included: groups of activists in informal 
groups; local, national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), religious 
JURXSLQJVLQYROYHGLQRUWDFNOLQJFRQIOLFWOREE\JURXSVDVZHOODVµXQFLYLOVRFLHW\¶JURXSVWKDW
may have been violent or opposed to democracy. While each country study explored three or 
four cases of civil society conflict, this paper does not focus on the individual conflicts, but 
rather on country-level communication practices and perceptions of the media. 
However, in order to situate the paper, the next sub-sections present a brief 
introduction to the country conflicts covered, for which we chose relevant CSOs to interview. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the cases, categorised thematically. 
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Table 1. An overview of the conflict cases 
Country Distribution 
and control of 
power 
Citizenship 
(rights, 
minorities, 
identity) 
Elections Transitional 
justice 
EGYPT  Maspero incident 
(2011) 
Presidential 
election 2012, 
2014 
Christian-Muslim 
violence (2013) 
KENYA  Somali community Elections 2007, 
2013 
Kenyatta/ICC 
SERBIA Ombudsman 
(2015) 
Pride Parade 
(2010) 
Election 2008  
(issues:  EU, 
Kosovo) 
0LORãHYLü/The 
Haag (2001) 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
Service delivery 
protests 
(Balfour 2009, 
2010; Zamdela 
2012-13) 
Xenophobic 
violence 
  
 State of the 
Nation Address 
(2015) 
   
 
Structure of the paper 
:KLOHWKHSDSHUH[DPLQHVFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUV¶GHILQLWLRQRIWKHVRXUFHVRIFRQIOLFW, and 
their perceptions of democracy, the bulk of the paper focuses on the communications 
practices of civil society organisations ± including their own communications, engagements 
through various nano-media and on social media, and efforts to communicate through the 
mainstream media. The paper begins by providing background on the conflict cases, then 
moves on to examine the key academic debates around civil society and democratisation, 
and the mediatisation of civil society conflicts. It then presents the interview methodology 
used to explore civil society practices in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa, and how the 
interviews were analysed to find similarities and differences across countries. 
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The findings chapter specifies: 1) the key sources of conflict as perceived by the 
interviewees in the countries and how the conflicts are similar or disparate across countries; 
2) common and divergent communication practices civil society organisations use to 
communicate internally; 3) shared and differing communication practices used by civil society 
to attract support from the public and other political role-players. Also under the findings 
section, the paper details how civil society organisations in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South 
Africa perceive the relevance and role of the media, what practices they deploy for engaging 
with the media, their perceptions of media coverage, and the implications of media coverage 
in either supporting or limiting democracy. 
The findings are further explored in the conclusion which examinies how 
communication and media are critical to civil society organising and contesting space in 
emerging democracies. While across the countries there are examples of political and social 
contestation, in all four countries there were also contestations about identity and citizenship 
± mostly channeled through ethnic and/or religious conflicts. 
7KH FRPPRQ QRWLRQ WKDW PHGLD LV FHQWUDO WR WKH µGHPRFUDWLF SXEOLF VSKHUH¶ DQG
deliberative democratic debate is questioned. This study establishes what the mitigating 
factors are, for example, in contexts where the mainstream media are repressed or state-
owned, and how commercial imperatives of mainstream media impact on their ability to 
provide an outlet for civil society organisations to engage with the state.  
The key research questions of this comparative analysis are as follows: 
x What types of political activism and protest are involved in democratisation conflicts? 
x What nano-media do CSOs use to communicate, both internally and with the outside 
world? 
x How do activist groups use traditional media to mobilise support and influence public 
debate and policy outcomes? 
x What is the use, influence and impact of ICTs in facilitating political activism and 
protest in democratisation conflicts? 
x What is the impact of mediated activism on the dynamic of democratisation conflicts 
in the four emerging democracies? 
 
Background to the conflict cases 
The cases discussed in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa overlap and contrast 
with each other. For example, all the countries had some elements of ethnic and/or religious 
conflict, and all the countries experienced conflict around the politics of political parties ± 
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focussing on election conflict in Egypt, Kenya and Serbia, and in South Africa, focussing on 
the conflict and coQWHVWDWLRQ DURXQG WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V \HDUO\ 6WDWH RI WKH 1DWLRQ DGGUHVV
However, the cases are also unique in the local specificities of the source of conflict, as will 
be discussed throughout this section. 
Egypt 
The conflict cases are intertwined with each other. In the aftermath of the deposal of 
Mubarak in the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the state was in limbo (Korotayev and Zinkina, 
2011) and protests were taking place widely. The executive and legislative authorities at the 
time, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), were facing an array of opposition 
of different forces. In order to try to reduce the opposition, consultation reportedly took place 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF. There was much uncertainty with respect to 
relations between the Islamist forces and SCAF in that period. The Muslim Brothers pulled 
out from the street protests, to give way to the political process managed by SCAF. 
Maspero Demonstrations 2011 
The 2011 Maspero clashes happened during the gap between the January Egyptian 
revolution and the November Parliamentary Elections. The conflict, triggered by a communal 
attack against a church, came only days before the parliamentary elections1 (Ramzy 2015) 
and may have been an attempt to cut down street protests by the military rulers. On the other 
hand, a discourse of Copts causing mayhem and instability fed into the discourse of the 
Islamists ± their traditional rivals (Guirguis 2012). In this respect, the Maspero incident further 
increased the schisms between the communal groups, and the Coptic groups and the state, 
weakening social cohesion further and increasing communal divides (Christiansen 2013).   
Presidential Elections of 2012 and 2014 
The two presidential elections in 2012 and 2014 are crucial turning points in post-
revolution Egypt and together reflect the uncertain outcome of the political transformations 
WDNLQJ SODFH WKHUH ,Q  WKH OHDGHU RI WKH 0XVOLP %URWKHUKRRG¶V )UHHGRP DQG -XVWLFH
Party, Mohammed Morsi, won the first democratic election in Egypt with less than 52 per 
cent of the vote, with a turnout of only 46 per cent and 52 per cent in the first and second 
rounds respectively (Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015a) $PLG µPDQLSXOation of the political 
SURFHVV JURZLQJ UHSUHVVLRQ DQG GHVLUH WR UHPDLQ DERYH WKH ODZ¶ (Elgindy 2012, p. 89), 
Morsi was ousted in 2013, and a new election in May 2014 confirmed General El-Sisi as 
                                                          
1
 Held from 28 November 2011 to 11 January 2012. 
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president with an overwhelming majority of 97 per cent, even though only 48 per cent of 
Egyptians turned out to vote (Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015a). 
Christian-Muslim Violence 2013 
Between the two elections, Christian-Muslim violence increased. Although direct state 
violence against Copts is a very rare event, with the Egyptian state typically presenting itself 
as the protector of the Coptic community (Guirguis 2012), the rapid upswing of protests 
against Morsi with Copts as vocal critics was interpreted as a sectarian move by Copts ± 
even though mainstream Muslims were also anti- the Muslim Brotherhood (Christiansen 
2013). Amid conflict and power struggles between different political factions, the Copts were 
attacked by Islamic activists, with an essential focus of the conflict on whether or not the 
Copts should be entitled to citizen rights and able to voice political views without being 
stigmatised (Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015a).  
Media role 
The (state) media played a significant role in stoking sectarian strife and
characterising clashes between the army and protestors as communal clashes between 
Muslims and Copts (Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015a). Meanwhile, social media activists 
played an important role providing counter narratives to the events using videos that they 
captured at the scene. The videos presented a very different reality to the one claiming the 
Copts were the initiators of the attack.  However, different videos have been used differently 
by different parties to validate their own claims, as violence dominated the scenes in 
Maspero (alhaqiqa4, 2011)(see: AlHaqiqa YouTube account 2011).  
Kenya 
The Kenya conflict cases focus on various types of ethnic violence, especially 
violence by and against the Somali ethnic group, violent conflict following the 2007 national 
elections and in the 2013 elections how conflict was limited, and the International Criminal 
Court investigation into the 2007 post-election ethnic conflict. Inequalities and injustices have 
been at the core of the socio-political conflicts in Kenya since the colonial era (Syagga 2006). 
While they entrenched social stratification, the conditions created also became the seeds of 
resistance to the colonial state (Simatei 2005). In post-independent Kenya, equal and 
equitable resource allocation has been a protracted challenge (Bigsten 1977), especially 
after the failure of the Majimbo system2 adopted at independence which envisioned strong 
                                                          
2
 Political devolution of power to the country's regions 
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regional governance with devolved powers and fiscal plans to safeguard regional autonomy 
(Cheeseman 2008). 
Somali conflict 
The Somali ethnic group is part of the Hamitic-Cushitic ethnic groups3 found in the 
Horn of Africa region, largely spread across the borders of Kenya to the North Eastern 
region, mainland Somalia, and parts of Ethiopia (De Waal 2004). They speak the Somali 
language and profess the Islamic faith. Generally, Kenyan-Somalis and the North Eastern 
part of Kenya have been largely marginalised economically and politically; the best summary 
RI WKLV EHLQJ WKH UHIHUHQFH WR WKH UHJLRQ DV µWKH RWKHU .HQ\D¶ 0DUJLQDOLVDWLRQ LQHTXDOLWLHV
and disparities in Kenya are attributable to the colonial economic model, disparate spread of 
missionary work, and the varying establishments of self-help activities (Cooksey et al., 1994). 
But much of the marginalisation in Kenya today has roots in the migratory and settlement 
SDWWHUQV RI .HQ\D¶V YDULRXV FRPPXQLWLHV DQG the resource endowments of the regions 
settled in (Schilling et al., 2012) so that the settlement of the pastoralist Somalis in the semi-
arid parts of Kenya is probably a big factor in their marginalisation too. At independence, the 
North Eastern, Coast and Rift Valley regions emerged as quite underdeveloped, trailing other 
regions in education, infrastructure and agricultural development (Ochieng, 1995, p. 89). The 
long history of conflict between Kenya and Somalia and between Kenya and the residents of 
North Eastern Province of Kenya4 has created a distorted image of Somalis5 DVµHQHPLHV¶RI
the Kenyan state. That image, real or imagined, has informed the inhuman treatment of 
Somalis in the hands of Kenyan authorities (Otunnu, 1992). The Somali situation in Kenya 
today revolves around issues of Islamic radicalisation, and fears over links to the Al-Shaabab 
(Botha 2014); the delicate situation with Somali-regugees (Jaji 2014); a booming business 
empire (de Waal 2015); and the persistent issue of marginalisation of North Eastern Kenya. 
Following the Westgate 6  attack, the government cracked down on Somali dominated 
neighbourhoods of Kileleshwa, South B but mostly Eastleigh and South C; Somalis were 
taken to Kasarani Stadium for a mass identification programme to establish the Kenyan and 
non-Kenyan Somalis living in Kenya illegally (Botha 2014). 
                                                          
3
 Are believed to have migrated from the Arabian Peninsula.  
4
 Formerly the Northern Frontier District under colonial rule.  
5
 The Kenyan-Somalis and Somali refugees.  
6
 Between September 21st and 24th WKHXSPDUNHWVKRSSLQJPDOO LQ1DLUREL¶V:HVWODQGVDUHD
the Westgate, was under siege from a terrorist attack by the Al-Shaabab. Up to 67 people died while 
other 175 were seriously wounded, and the Kenyan security agencies claimed to have killed up to four 
of the gunmen. 
8 
 
Election conflict 2007 and 2013 
The 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya was caused by, among other factors, 
inequalities perceived ethno-geographically (Schilling et al., 2012; Waki Commission, 2008). 
While the Somalis and the larger North Eastern region remained relatively calm during the 
skirmishes, past experiences indicate that they have bigger grievances with the Kenyan 
government7.  The violence left 1,400 dead (Cheeseman 2008), and the media, most notably 
vernacular radio stations, were accused of having incited ethnic hatred. At the same time, the 
mainstream media were accused of abandoning impartiality, deliberately covering up 
evidence of vote rigging (Ismail and Deane 2008). During the 2013 elections, the media 
SOD\HGDYHU\GLIIHUHQWUROH$VSDUWRIDEURDGHU³SHDFHQDUUDWLYH´(Cheeseman et al. 2014), 
the media avoided content that might trigger further conflict, and mostly adopted the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V SRVLWLRQ WKDW LW ZDV LOOHJLWLPDWH WR PDNH SXEOLF VSHHFK ZKLFK ZDV OLNHO\ WR
inspire instability or threaten national unity (Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015a). The two 
elections reflect the dilemmas of free speech and competitive elections in volatile, divided 
societies. 
The Kenyatta ICC Trial 2014 
The ICC preliminary investigation and later attempt to prosecute those involved in the 
2007 election violence were vigorously opposed by the governments of Mwai Kibaki (2007-
2013) and later Uhuru Kenyatta (2013-) (Mueller 2014). These governments invested 
considerable energy in challenging the legitimacy of ICC proceedings against President 
Kenyatta and his running-mate, William Ruto (ibid.). While initially, the Kenyan media 
supported the ICC proceedings, as the government started demonising critical civil society 
DQG PHGLD DV µVHOO RXWV¶ DQG WUDLWRUVPRUH FULWLFLVP ZDV GLUHFWHG DW WKH ,&& (Voltmer and 
Kraetzschmar 2015a). However, counter-currents can also be observed with the rise of 
social media like twitter (Ogola 2015)DQHZ1DLURELEDVHG³7ZLWWHUDWL´XWLOLVHGVRFLDOmedia 
to criticise Kenyatta and Ruto and defend their prosecution. 
Media role 
The largely commericialised media in Kenya have played a key role in the Kenyan 
conflicts, inciting prejudice against Somalis, inciting violence in the 2007 elections and 
working to quell violence in the 2013 elections, and switching positions on the ICC trial of 
those involved in the 2007 election violence. However, as in Egypt, social media is allowing 
for the rise of alternative voices that contest mainstream media narratives. 
                                                          
7
 Their war has largely been with the central government over legitimacy; and the pastoral conflicts 
informed by their nomadic culture, where they raid their neighbours for livestock.  
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Serbia 
Following the Yugoslavian war which broke up Yugoslavia into separate states and 
DIWHU WKH RYHUWKURZ RI 6ORERGDQ 0LORãHYLü in 2000, Serbian civil society is recognised as 
playing a role in consolidating democracy in the country (Kostovicova 2006a). However, 
there has also been much contestation between on one hand, liberal notions of civil society, 
DQGRQ WKHRWKHU µXQFLYLO¶VRFLHW\ (Kostovicova 2006a). This contestation has played out in 
the conflicts under study in this paper, with tensions over whether to integrate into a 
cosmopolitan and liberal Europe, or to instead favour nationalism (ibid.) 
The Pride Parade of October 2010 
The public debate over the Pride Parade held in September and October 2010 in 
Belgrade was marked by contestation between those pushing a tolerance agenda and those 
XVLQJ WKH µGHPRQLVDWLRQRIVH[XDOPLQRULWLHV¶ WRSXVKDQDWLonalist agenda (Gould and Moe 
 6WDNLü . The Pride Parade was marked by violent and militant opposition from 
nationalist groups and the Serbian Orthodox Church (Gould and Moe 2015; Voltmer and 
Kraetzschmar 2015a). This reaction from Serbian right-wing extremists, (in contrast to 
support for the parade from most political parties) highlighted the role that civil society can 
sometimes play in opposing democracy (Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015a).  
The 2008 Election 
8QIROGLQJ IURP 0DUFK WR 0D\ GXULQJ 6HUELD¶V  HOHFWLRQ FDPSDLJQLQJ ERWK
.RVRYR¶V GHFODUDWLRQ RI LQGHSHQGHQFH DQG WKH SURSRVHG 6HUELDQ LQWHJUDWLRQ LQWR WKH
European Union (Dzihic and Wieser 2011; Jou 2010) created conflict. The conflict involved a 
broad range of political actors ranging from civil society groups to political parties. It marked 
DFULWLFDOMXQFWXUHLQ6HUELD¶VSROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQWDQGSDYHGWKHZD\IRUDPRUe consistent 
pro-EU policy (Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015a).  
7KH0LORãHYLü,&7<7ULDO 
6XUURXQGLQJ WKHDUUHVWRI0LORãHYLüDQGKLVVHFUHWLYHH[WUDGLWLRQ WR WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, a heated debate over issues of 
transitional justice dominated the public agenda for months (April ± July 2001) (Voltmer and 
Kraetzschmar 2015a)7KHWULDOLWVHOIUHVXOWHGLQDKHLJKWHQHGµGHIHQVLYHQDWLRQDOLVP¶DPRQJ
some Serbs with somHDUJXLQJWKH,&7<ZDVWU\LQJWR³HVWDEOLVKFROOHFWLYHJXLOW´DQGVKDPH
the whole nation (Steflja 2010). But even before the trial, Serbians were divided about 
ZKHWKHU0LORãHYLüVKRXOGEHWULHGDWDOODQGLIVRLQVLGHRURXWVLGHWKHFRXQWU\(Gordy 2014), 
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with pro-European, cosmopolitan groups in favour of the ICTY trial, while nationalist groups ± 
including the police and armed forces ± opposed the trial (Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015a). 
Role of the media 
(YHQ DIWHU WKH IDOO RI 0LORãHYLü¶V UHJLPH WKH 6HUELDQ PHGLD UHPDLQHG VWURQJO\
nationalistic (UMDYHFDQG9ROþLþ. However, over the period of the conflicts analysed in 
this study, the media increasingly adopted certain types of religious language, as well as the 
language of Western media, vis à vis the war on terrorism and crime discourse, and 
³DSSURSULDWHG WKHP LQWR D 6HUELDQ QDWLRQDO SROLWLFDO FRQWH[W´ (ibid., p. 81). This use of 
borrowed discourses alongside ongoing nationalist discourse has fed, for example, into the 
FRQIOLFWDURXQG.RVRYRGHEDWHV LQ WKHHOHFWLRQVDQGWKH0LORãHYLü WULDO 1DWLRQDOLVWLF
discourses implying that there is a Western conspiracy against Serbia have also fed into 
homophobic discourses and conflict around the pride parade 6WDNLü. 
South Africa  
The 27-28 April 1994 elections in South Africa heralded the end of apartheid, and the 
introduction of universal franchise. However, this new period ± RIWHQFDOOHG µWKHQHZ6RXWK
$IULFD¶ - has by no means seen the end of contestation in society. Much of the protest 
centres on the lack of economic transformation, despite the political transition, and the 
ongoing levels of inequality in one of the most unequal societies in the world. A related issue 
is the capture of the public sector by a new wave of black elites against whom accusations of 
corruption have become the norm. 
Community protests 
From about 2000 onwards, various communities8 started to contest the form that the 
roll-out of public services took (neo-liberal, cost-recovery and privatisation) (Ballard et al. 
2006) )URP  RQZDUGV WKHUH ZDV DQ XSVZLQJ LQ ZKDW LV WHUPHG µVHUYLFH GHOLYHU\
SURWHVWV¶9, tackling inter alia, poor access to water and electricity, limited roll-out of housing 
projects, lack of actual participation in local politics despite policy to that effect, and 
corruption and nepotism at local council level (Akinboade et al. 2013; Alexander 2010; 
Atkinson, 2007; Booysen 2007; Burger 2009). This can be generically described as 
challenging ongoing inequality in one of the most unequal societies in the world.  
                                                          
8
 Community protests were initially united under regional banners such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum 
(APF) in Gauteng, and the Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) in the Western Cape (Madlingozi 2007). 
9
 These protests were no longer organised under umbrella regional organisations, but remained at the 
level of individual ward in local municipal government. 
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Xenophobia 
From the early 2000s onwards, the country also saw an upswing in xenophobic 
violence, culminating in two waves of extreme violence in 2008 and 2015. These waves of 
violence have also been articulated as responses to ongoing poverty and inequality, with 
foreign nationals, for example, accused of competing for low-paying jobs (Dodson 2010). At 
the same time, the violence could also be seen as defining who is truly South African and 
who has the right to access public services and who is excluded (Neocosmos 2010). 
The 2015 State of the Nation Address 
At the same time as the local-level forms of contestation, at national level various 
accusations of corruption rocked the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), amid 
which a new political party - the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) - managed to secure 
VHDWVLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VSDUOLDPHQW(Schulz-Herzenberg 2014). One key corruption scandal was 
DURXQGWKHXSJUDGHVWRWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VKRPH(Beresford 2015), leading to the EFF disrupting 
WKH6WDWHRIWKH1DWLRQDGGUHVVZLWKGHPDQGVWKDWWKH3UHVLGHQWµSD\EDFNWKHPRQH\¶
(Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015a). 
Role of the media 
The South African media has played a significant role in terms of building negative 
perceptions of community protests, and criminalising and delegitimising protestors (Pointer 
2015). Regarding xenophobia, media have been argued to be complicit in discourses 
encouraging xenophobia (e.g. Danso and McDonald 2001; Dodson 2010), expressing some 
anti-immigrant discourses. Even when the media does well in covering the xenophobic 
conflicts by expressing concerns, it fails to cover the causal factors underpinning such 
violence (Hickel 2014). Media was at the centre of the 2015 SONA conflict, with operatives 
within the government having jammed communication within parliament, therefore acting to 
suppress media coverage (Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015b). This suppression activity was 
thus thoroughly critiqued by independent media voices. 
Research interest and conceptual background 
The analysis for this research is based on some key assumptions in the literature 
around the role of media and civil society in democratisation conflicts. These assumptions 
centre on a significant role envisaged for media and civil society in deepening democracy in 
transitional contexts. Civil society, seen as a dense network of civil associations, is said to 
promote the stability and effectiveness of the democratic polity through both the effects of 
DVVRFLDWLRQRQFLWL]HQV
³KDELWVRIWKHKHDUW´DQGWKHDELOLW\RIDVVRFLDWLRQVWRPRELOLVHFLWL]HQV
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on behalf of public causes (Putnam 2001). Civil society is often credited with resisting 
authoritarianism by creating voluntary associations that democratise society from below by 
pushing for change (Foley and Edwards 1996).  
This section of the paper explores definitions of civil society, in order to set the tone 
for how civil society organisations were identified in this research. After defining civil society, 
we then move on to examine how the media represents civil society ± particularly civil society 
in protest ± with the aim of setting the tone for how the civil society organisations interviewed 
in this study understand media coverage of their activities.  
Defining civil society 
There has been widespread assumption of the global relevance of civil society in 
strengthening development and democracy (e.g. Booth and Richard 1998). Lewis (2001, p. 
11) suggests that civil society is also relevant in non-Western contexts, in that local 
PHDQLQJV³FUHDWHGDURXQGWKHFRQFHSWRIFLYLOVRFLHW\«KDVEHFRPHSDUWRIDQLQFUHDVLQJO\
univerVDOQHJRWLDWLRQEHWZHHQFLWL]HQVVWDWHVDQGPDUNHWDURXQGWKHZRUOG´ 
A different strand of civil society thinking which has also been influential in some parts 
of the world in recent decades, influenced by Antonio Gramsci, argues that civil society is the 
arena, separate from state and market, in which ideological hegemony is contested, implying 
that civil society contains a wide range of organisations which both challenge and uphold the 
existing order (Lewis 2001). HowHYHU³WKHYDOXHVFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVSURPRWHDUHQRWDOZD\V
GHPRFUDWLF´ 6SDVLü  S , and civil society structures do not automatically lead to 
GHPRFUDWLF LPDJLQDULHV ,Q VRPH FRXQWULHV ³FUiminal organizations build their networks of 
VXSSRUWLQWKHSRRUFRPPXQLWLHVLQH[FKDQJHIRUSDWURQDJHDQGIRUFHGSURWHFWLRQ´ (Castells 
2008 p. 84), and civil society may also be violent or supporting repressive agendas (Glasius 
2010)7KLVOHDGVXVWRFRQVLGHUZKHWKHUWKHHPHUJLQJFRQFHSWRIµXQFLYLO¶VRFLHW\LVXVHIXOLQ
thinking about manifestations of civil society that challenge liberal democratic values.  
Glasius (2010) argues that violence is usually singled out as a characteristic of 
µXQFLYLO¶ VRFLHW\ EXW WKDW H[FOXVLYLVW RU GRJPDWLF LGHRORJLHV DQG JHQHUDO UXOH-breaking also 
count; and that academic debates centre on whether the use of the category is too western-
centric and whether uncivil society should be considered as part of a wider category of civil 
society. John Keane (2013 p.135) KDV DUJXHG WKDW ³DOO NQRZQ IRUPV RI FLYLO VRFLHW\ DUH
SODJXHGE\HQGRJHQRXVVRXUFHVRI LQFLYLOLW\´EXWQRQHWKHOHVVGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQDFLYLO
and an un-civil society, differentiated by a tipping point in the use of violence:  
A highly developed civil society can and normally does contain within itself violent 
tendencies, that is, patterns of incivility or behaviour prone to violence that can and 
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do threaten to accumulate synergetically to the point where the occasional violence 
of some against some within a civil society degenerates into the constant violence of 
all against all of an uncivil society (Keane 2013, p.136).  
Similarly,  
[v]iolence or non-violent physical resistance has been one way of acting politically for 
those not granted the authority to speak. Such violence ± by contrast with the 
legitimate violence of the state (Max Weber) ± lies at the edge of legitimate politics; it 
LVRIWHQQRWJLYHQWKHQDPHRISROLWLFVDQGFDOOHGµWHUURULVP¶(Couldry 2015, p.120).  
Definitional issues also revolve around the scope of civil society ² does it include 
organisations and associations which are not always voluntary, such as churches or religious 
sects, and does it include political parties and trade unions, or should the term be confined to 
voluntary activist movements? The main conceptual issue is the supposed link between civil 
VRFLHW\ DQG GHPRFUDF\ ZKHWKHU FLYLO VRFLHW\ LV YLHZHG DV ³WKH FRUQHUVWRQH RI GHPRFUDF\´
(e.g. Castells 2008, p.78)ZLWKFLYLOVRFLHW\VHHQDVSURYLGLQJ³WKHLPSHWXVIRUHVWDEOLVKLQJ
elections, as well as the leadership and resources for political parties contesting these 
HOHFWLRQV´(Holm et al. 1996, p.43). 
A definitional concern when looking at civil society organisations centres on 
delineating civil society groups in terms of whether they participate in social or political 
activism. However, there is a continuum between these forms of activism, and groups may 
act differently at different times. One would normally associate political activism with party 
politics, and civil societ\JURXSVEHILWWLQJWKHµSROLWLFDODFWLYLVW¶ WDJZRXOGEHWKRVHDOLJQHGWR
political parties or political causes, such as challenging the form of government or demanding 
human rights (Guobin Yang, 2009) ,Q WKH VDPH YHLQ JURXSV LGHQWLILHG DV µVRFLDO DFWLYLVWV¶
ZRXOG SUREDEO\ EH µQRQ-DOLJQHG¶ WR SDUW\ SROLWLFV DQG IRFXVLQJ on/advocating a range of 
causes that may include equal access to housing and water, the environment, LGBTI rights, 
access to medicine, minority rights, etc. (ibid.). The distinction between the two types of 
activism is generally based on where activism is targeted, with political activism 
conceptualised as activity targeting the state and political reform (ibid.), whereas social 
activism might seek to change society.  
So, for example, in gender-focussed activist groups, those seeking policy change 
from government in terms of the role of women in society can be seen as political activists, 
while those challenging the roles of men and women in society might be regarded as social 
activists. However, it is possible that one civil society group may take on society and the 
state. So, for example, the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa targeted the state 
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with demands for medicine, but also multinational pharmaceutical companies to make anti-
retrovirals affordable to South Africans. In terms of more conservative civil society groupings, 
as in Serbia, anti-LGBTI activists might demand that the state legally reserves marriage for 
heterosexual relationships, while at the same time encouraging homophobia in society 
6WDNLü 
In Kenya, the notion of political parties is very different to Western ideas of political 
parties because: 
Leaders and politicians have shifted from party to party and in the process made 
strange bedfellow alliances with each other. Even those who are in opposition now 
have been in each oWKHU¶V JRYHUQPHQWV DQG FDELQHWV DW RQH WLPH RU DQRWKHU 
(Mueller, 2008, p. 200).  
Therefore, it is difficult to conceive of activism in Kenya as being embedded in parties 
(political activism), and with political parties in a constant state of flux it is difficult for civil 
society to build a momentum of political activism (Bodewes, 2010; Orvis, 2003)  On the other 
hand, one finds initiatives in the slums aimed at environmental clean-up and tackling 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VQRQ-provision of services (Wamucii, 2011), which while being usually defined 
as social activism, could easily spin into political activism if organised to challenge the 
government to provide services. The difficulties in defining activism also become clear when 
RQHFRQVLGHUV³UHOLJLRXVDFWLYLVP´ (Silberman et al., 2005) in Kenya, where for example the 
increasing sacralisation of conflict has led to the rise of Al-Shabaab, which sees itself as part 
RID³ODUJHUPLOOHQDULDQVWUXJJOHEHWZHHQ,VODPDQGLQILGHOLW\´(Vidino et al., 2010, p. 221).  
Under Mubarak in Egypt, prior to the 2011 revolution, CSOs had to register with the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. Licence applications were turned down for vague reasons, and the 
state had a say over board membership and decision making; thus the state exerted 
powerful control over CSO activities (Altan-Olcay and Icduygu, 2012).  Furthermore, CSOs in 
Egypt were dominated by older men of a higher socio-economic status, regardless of the 
segment at which their work was targeted (ibid +HQFH ³&62V ZHUH VHHQ DV PRUH
sXFFHVVIXO LQUDOO\LQJVXSSRUWIRU µDSROLWLFDO¶YDOXHVWKDQIRU µSROLWLFDOO\VHQVLWLYHRQHV¶´ibid., 
SILOOLQJDYRLGFUHDWHGE\WKHVWDWH¶VUHWUHDWIURPZHOIDUHSURYLVLRQLQJ$UJXDEO\WKHQ
activism in Egypt was usually social activism, but with the 2005 rise of Kefaya10, its discourse 
on democratisation and call for Mubarak to resign (Lim, 2012) arguably the terrain shifted 
and activism became more political. However, this is rather simplistic, given that oppositional 
movements in Egypt have been, and continue to be, polarised based on religious affiliation 
                                                          
10
 $ODUJHO\\RXWKPRYHPHQWWKDWFKDOOHQJHG0XEDUDN¶VSUHVLGHQF\(Shehata 2011). 
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² whether Islamist or liberal secular (ibid.).  Even in the 2011 Tahir Square uprising, where 
these religious differences were overcome temporarily, it is difficult to characterise the 
SURWDJRQLVWVRIWKHUHYROWZLWKVRPHDUJXLQJWKDWWKHUHYROWZDVDERXW³EUHDGIUHHGRPDQG
VRFLDO MXVWLFH´ZKLOHRWKHUVDUJXHG WKDW LWZDVDERXW ³KXPDQGLJQLW\´ (Baker, 2015). Baker 
(2015) also argues that it is difficult to separate out the extent to which the sought after 
changes are simply national regime change, or a contestation of globalisation and the 
political alliances between national governments and the multinationals who supply 
weapons. 
,Q 6HUELD WKHUH ³KDV EHHQ D SDUWLal transfer of personnel and influence from civil 
society to the state apparatus: some individuals have moved from civic organizations to 
positions of power, mostly at the level deputy ministers, advisors, or in local and regional 
ERGLHV´ 6SDVLü  S54). This means that former political activists have become 
embedded in the state, and their challenges, therefore, can be seen as political. 
1HYHUWKHOHVV DV LQ :HVWHUQ FRXQWULHV \RXQJ SHRSOH LQ 6HUELD KDYH ³WXUQHG DZD\ IURP
PDLQVWUHDPSROLWLFV´ WRFUHDWH ³QHZDUHQDVDQG LQQRYDWLYH ZD\VRI H[SUHVVLQJ WKHLU YLHZV
SROLWLFDOFODLPVDQGSDUWLFXODU LGHQWLWLHV´(Vukelic and Stanojevic, 2012, p. 388). Particularly, 
\RXQJ SHRSOH KDYH EHFRPH LQWHUHVWHG LQ µOLIHVW\OH SROLWLFV¶ DQd neighbourhood politics of 
VTXDWWLQJ DQG UHFODLPLQJ ³GHYDVWDWHG SXEOLF VSDFHV XVXDOO\ IROORZHG E\ QHJRWLDWLRQV ZLWK
local authorities in order to reconstruct places, revitalise neighbourhoods, and make a long 
term contribution to sustainable development RIWKHORFDOFRPPXQLW\´ âHãLüHWDOS
195). In respect of JD\ULJKWVLQ6HUELDZKLFKFDQEHUHJDUGHGDVµOLIHVW\OHSROLWLFV¶LQIDFWWKH
LGBTI movement was able to link itself to pro-EU activism  and the pro-democracy cause in 
WKH  HOHFWLRQV *RXOG DQG 0RH  VKRZLQJ KRZ µVRFLDO DFWLYLVP¶ DQG µSROLWLFDl 
DFWLYLVP¶FDQLQWHUVHFW 
Like Serbia, South Africa also experienced a situation in which former activists were 
incorporated into the state in 1994, and this saw a temporary demobilisation of society 
immediately after the end of apartheid (Marais, 2011; Seekings, 2000). However, as early as 
2000 civil society started organising again to resist the privatisation of public services, 
through organisations such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and Anti-Eviction 
Campaign (AEC). These social movements undertook social activism around provision of 
services to poor communities, while at the same time undertaking political activism 
challenging global neo-liberal policies imposed by the popularly elected African National 
Congress (ANC) (Reddy, 2010). In addition there has been a proliferation of so-called 
µVHUYLFH GHOLYHU\ SURWHVWV¶ ZKHUH LPSRYHULVKHG FRPPXQLWLHV DFURVV WKH Fountry rise up to 
protest against inter alia lack of housing, water, electricity and sanitation provision, poorly 
performing local systems of participatory governance, corruption and nepotism at local 
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government level, etc. (Alexander, 2010a; 2010b; Bond and Mottiar, 2013; Booysen, 2007b; 
Kunene, 2014; Piper and Nadvi, 2010; Tapela, 2012 and others). What is interesting to note, 
at least in the South African case, is that while several of the issue-based organisations 
IRFXVWKHLUDFWLYLVPDURXQGSUHGRPLQDQWO\µVRFLDO LVVXHV¶WKHUHDUHDOVRSROLWLFDOXQGHUWRQHV
to the content of their activities. Some of them maintain organic albeit informal links to 
political parties, rendering it somewhat difficult to allocate an unproblematic tag to the scope 
of their activism. 
In Serbia, civil society organisations are largely disconnected from the grassroots, 
and civil activism is primarily a middle-class activity, with organisations having a weak 
SRWHQWLDO ³WRVKLIWEDODQFHRIVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOSRZHUDQGWKXVFRQWULEXWH WRVWUHQJWKHQLQJ
JRYHUQPHQW DFFRXQWDELOLW\ DQG UXOH RI ODZ´ 9XNRYLü  S. Nevertheless, the post- 
0LORãHYLü HUD KDV VHHQ WKH ULVH RI µLOOLEHUDO FLYLO VRFLHW\¶ ZLWK D KRVW RI ³LOOLEHUDO LGHRORJLHV
including anti-Semitism, H[FOXVLYHQDWLRQDOLVP[HQRSKRELDDQG UDFLVP´ (Kostovicova 2006, 
p.31)6XFKHOHPHQWVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\PD\EH³PXFKOHVVGHPRFUDWLFDQG  more dangerous, 
WKDQWKHJRYHUQPHQW´6SDVLüS. Some protest movements have the potential to 
WULJJHU ³SROLWLFDO SRODUL]DWLRQ DQG WKXV UDSLG YDFDWLQJ RI WKH XQFRPPLWWHG RU PRGHUDWH
FHQWUH« >SXVKLQJ UHJLPH HOLWHV@ WRZDUGV PRUH H[FOXVLYH DQG UHSUHVVLYH SROLFLHV´
9ODGLVDYOMHYLüS. 
This comparative analysis of media and civil society in democratisation conflicts 
therefore acknowledges that definitional concerns are bound to influence the assessment of 
civil society in the context of each transitional society. Not all civil society actors are activists, 
and some civil society actors (e.g. the Treatment Action CampaigQ LQ 6RXWK $IULFD GRQ¶W
threaten the fundamental paradigm and could thus be integrated within the general 
consensus (Robins and von Lieres 2004). This paper seeks to identify the nature of civil 
society in each of the transitional societies studied and uses the conceptualisations 
presented above to identify different types of civil society actors in each society and within 
each case study ± whether they may be pushing for social change and/or political change, 
DQGZKHWKHUWKH\PD\EHFLYLORUµXQFLYLO¶LQWKHLUDFWLRQV$VWKHSDSHUZLOOGLVFXVVLQWKHQH[W
section, the nature of civil society is also linked to media coverage as the mainstream media 
will always cover protests because of who orchestrates these protests, but the way the 
media covers protest may influence how civil society organisations are perceived. 
The role of media in democracies and the mediatisation of conflict 
The IRFXV RQ WKH PHGLD¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK FLYLO VRFLHW\ LQ GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ FRQIOLFWV
rests on the notion that contemporary conflicts are increasingly mediatised events (Cottle 
2006). Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993, p.116) argue that gaining standing in the media is 
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³RIWHQ D QHFHVVDU\ FRQGLWLRQ EHIRUH WDUJHWV RI LQIOXHQFH ZLOO JUDQW DPRYHPHQW UHFRJQLWLRQ
DQGGHDOZLWK LWVFODLPVDQGGHPDQGV´Media coverage of political and social activism and 
conflict impacts 1) how civil society groups are viewed within the public sphere and 2) 
communications strategies these groups devise in order to maximise visibility and influence.  
These assumptions about the media and civil society should not be taken for granted. 
Particularly in transitional contexts the ability for civil society organisations to connect with 
the interests of a diverse and often polarised, unequal or conflictual citizenry can be 
questioQHG ZKLOH WKH PHGLD¶V DELOLW\ WR DUWLFXODWH WKH EURDG UDQJH RI ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV WKH
public interest is often hampered by social, political or economic interests.  
%HFDXVHFHUWDLQFRQYHQWLRQDOµQHZVYDOXHV¶LQIRUPWKHZD\QHZVLVVHOHFWHG(Barnett 
2003; Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999) and produced, democratisation conflicts are likely to be 
IUDPHG DV µHYHQWV¶ ZLWK HPSKDVLV RQ WKH VSHFWDFOH DQG µRIILFLDO¶ VRXUFHV VXFK DV
spokespersons are likely to be given prominence. This assumption will be further explored in 
this study, with a particular focus on how activists view their representation in the media and 
what strategies activists use to influence media agendas. The focus on media use for 
activism is however complicated by the difficulty of drawing clear delineations between 
political and social activism, because there is a continuum between these forms of activism. 
The post-industrial West has witnessed a refocusing of political engagement outside 
RIWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\DQGSROLWLFDOSDUW\V\VWHPJLYLQJELUWKWRWKHHPHUJHQFHRIµQHZSROLWLFV¶
(Dahlgren and Gurevitch 2005). The assumption is that activists rely on mainstream media to 
reach audiences that may be of strategic importance to their cause, even if these may not be 
their primary support base, but that they also use new digital and mobile technologies to 
mobilise for activism and communicate with their constituencies.  
Methodology 
Description of sample 
Interviewees were selected based on their involvement in the conflicts presented in 
sections 1 and 2 of this paper and were sampled using the snowball technique (Priest 2009 
p. 101). This comprised starting with known individuals in activist organisations, and allowing 
them to suggest further interviewees within or outside their organisations. The sample 
includes activists and organisers from key organisations involved in the conflicts, as well as 
others (such as religious leaders) working on the ground during the democratisation case 
studies in each of the four countries. In most instances, more than one respondent was 
chosen from each key organisation, to allow for a range of opinions and a degree of 
triangulation.  
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In most cases we attempted to interview activists whose organisations were covered 
in the media sample that was content-analysed in previous parts of the MeCoDEM study. 
Depending on saturation and local circumstances, activists and civil society members from 
additional organisations were also included, but only those who were involved in some way 
in the conflicts under study. Within the country interview samples, preferably all three conflict 
cases under study would have been covered. Moreover, we aimed at achieving a balance 
between activists from different types of organisations and who were involved in different 
ways; taking care to interview both junior and senior/ more experienced activists, men and 
ZRPHQ WKRVH IURP IRUPDO 1*2V DQG WKRVH IURP FRPPXQLW\ RUJDQLVDWLRQV RU µVRFLDO
PRYHPHQWV¶ 
The dataset consists of material collected in 91 interviews which were conducted in 
the four countries: 19 interviews in Egypt, 24 interviews in Kenya, 20 interviews in Serbia and 
28 interviews in South Africa. In total, the sample builds on 110.5 hours of interview 
conversation (40 hours, 39 minutes in Egypt; 20 hours, 44 minutes in Kenya; 18 hours, 15 
minutes in Serbia; and 30 hours, 52 minutes in South Africa). The average length was one 
hour and 12 minutes per interview (two hours, eight minutes in Egypt; 49 minutes in Kenya; 
54 minutes in Serbia; and 66 minutes in South Africa).  
Techniques of data collection and data analysis 
Interviews 
7KHUHVHDUFKIRUZRUNSDFNDJHµ&LYLOVRFLHW\SROLWLFDODFWLYLVPDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQV
LQ GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ FRQIOLFWV¶ UHOLHG SUHGRPLQDQWO\ RQ H[WHQGHG TXDOLWDWLYH VHPL-structured 
interviews. This W\SH RI LQWHUYLHZ LV GHVLJQHG WR H[SORUH DQ LQWHUYLHZHH¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ LQ
detail; they are lengthy and have a degree of flexibility and open-endedness, and involve 
fewer respondents than surveys (Priest 2009, p. 223). The goal of the interviews was to gain 
DQ LQVLGHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH RQ PHGLD SURFHVVHV LQ DFWLYLVW DQG FLYLO VRFLHW\ RUJDQLVDWLRQV
Interviews are often used when participant observation or ethnographic methods are not 
feasible (ibid., p. 101). In this instance, while ethnographic methods were considered, limited 
time to gain access to organisations was a primary reason for focusing on interviews instead.  
Qualitative interviews usually begin with an interview schedule or guide to ensure that 
all topics are covered, but makes allowance for probing topics that had not been anticipated 
or need further questioning (Priest 2009, p. 101). The interview guide starts with a basic 
checklist of information (Bertrand and Hughes 2005, p. 79) that could be analysed to get an 
overview of the demographics of participants, their position within organisations, etc.  All 
interviewees completed a questionnaire to provide key demographic data in order to collect a 
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JHQHUDOSLFWXUHRI WKH LQWHUYLHZHHV¶SHUVRQDODQGSURfessional backgrounds. Data was also 
FROOHFWHGRQ LQWHUYLHZHHV¶SHUVRQDO LQYROYHPHQW LQHDFKFRQIOLFWFDVH WKHVWUXFWXUHRI WKHLU
organisation and strategies for mobilisation, internal and external communication, 
relationship with and views of mainstream media, and values and objectives. 
The interview guide for work package 5 covered three main areas: 
1. The types of political activism involved in the country conflict cases 
2. The use an influence of ICTs in facilitating political activism and protest in the country 
conflict cases 
3. The perceived impact of mediated activism on democratisation conflicts 
 
Interviews began with an innovative reconstruction technique (Flick 2002; Flick et al. 
2007; Reich 2009, 2006) WR H[SORUH DQ LQWHUYLHZHH¶V RZQ LQYolvement in the selected 
democratisation conflicts. At the start of the interview activists were shown a copy of a 
newspaper item covering the conflict, and asked to use this to recall and reconstruct the 
processes involved in the emergence of the conflict, as well as media coverage of the 
FRQIOLFW7KHDLPRIWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQZDVWRIRVWHU³UHWURVSHFWLYHLQWURVSHFWLRQ´(Flick 2002, 
p. 120) and to take the interviewees back in time to remember particular circumstances while 
also being guided to refer to specific factors. Thereby we aimed to achieve descriptive and 
in-depth narratives and insights that transcend the possibility of socially desired responses 
from the activists. 
Data analysis and ethics 
During the data gathering process, several mechanisms were put in place to ensure 
that data was collected consistently and that the research instrument was applied validly. We 
adhered to ethical standards as per the guidelines of the overall MeCoDEM project, and 
interviewees were given the option to remain anonymous. Data was encrypted and files were 
labelled to ensure anonymity of the interviewees. 
In addition, the interview guide included a brief description of how interviewers should 
approach each question. This was intended to explain what type of information the question 
was meant to elicit. A detailed interview manual was provided to each country team and 
interviewers within the team. This documentation was provided in English and country team 
leaders arranged for research documents to be accurately translated into local languages 
where required. The research instruments were all tested in four pilot interviews, one 
conducted in each country. Amendments to phrasing and sequence of questions was made 
based on the findings of the pilot interviews. For work package 5 we used the existing 
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transcription aQGWUDQVODWLRQPDQXDOWKDWZDVGHYHORSHGGXULQJZRUNSDFNDJHµ-RXUQDOLVWLF
HWKLFVDQGZRUNSUDFWLFHVLQFRQIOLFWVRFLHWLHV¶7KLVHQVXUHGFRQVLVWHQF\DFURVVFRXQWULHV 
An NVivo coding template was provided to each country team who entered their data 
and carried out basic coding of the interviews.  An integrated dataset was then developed 
incorporating data from all four countries. A final analysis was carried out on this dataset and 
the findings are detailed below. 
Findings 
In reporting on the findings of this research, we first examine how civil society 
organisations articulated the causes of conflict and where they targeted their activism. The 
paper then looks at the internal and external communication tools and techniques used by 
civil society organisations to mobilise members and society at large. The extent to which civil 
society organisations involved in the case study conflicts are mediatised is then examined, 
particularly looking at the perceived importance of gaining media coverage, how civil society 
organisations engage the media and perceptions of the quality of media coverage, as well as 
the significance of social media in gaining a voice. Finally, we discuss perceptions of conflict 
situations and how the media portrayal such conflict impacts on understandings of 
democracy in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. 
Perceived causes of conflict and target of activism 
In terms of who civil society organisations directed their activism at, the countries 
showed quite some overlap, though with different emphasis ± with every country mentioning 
politicians, government officials and the police as problematic (see Table 2). This suggests 
that regardless of the particular forms of recent democratisation in the country, the form of 
governance and the manner for dealing with conflicts (through armed officials) is still strongly 
a place of contestation.  
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Table 2. Targets of activism 
Egypt Christian-Muslim 
violence 
Islamists, Muslim Brotherhood 
Maspero 
democratisation 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces, the state, military police, Muslim 
Brotherhood, Prime Minister 
Presidential 
elections 
Muslim Brotherhood 
Kenya ICC Government, national and regional politics in the African Union, 
coalition government, poor electoral commission, ICC as part of the 
µFRORQLDOVWUXFWXUHV WKDW LPSHGH WKHVRXWK¶(XURSHDQ8QLRQ WKH(8
Parliament, the UN Security Council  
Somali community National Police Service Commission, the presidency  and executive, 
police, courts not applying rule of law 
Elections Electoral body, government, opposition party, media, citizens, civil 
society organisations, everybody - young and old, men and women, 
politicians 
Serbia 2008 Elections Globalisation - NATO, USA, EU, politicians, opposition party 
0LORãHYLü ICTY 
Trial 
UN Security Council, the Hague Tribunal, political opponents of 
0LORãHYLü, state security, foreign governments, foreign-funded NGOs 
Ombudsman 2015 Media, Ministry of the Interior, Prime Minister, police, government, 
politicians 
Pride Parade Political parties, violent groups acting against the parade, LGBT 
activists forcing deviant practices on others, hooligans attacking gay 
rights activists, the state, the police, consumerism, Dveri, European 
Union 
South 
Africa 
Community 
protests 
Politicians, African National Congress, government, police minister, 
provincial government, provincial commissioner of police, local 
JRYHUQPHQW PXQLFLSDOLWLHV µ&LW\¶ FRXQFLOORUV ORFDO ZDWHU DQG
sanitation department, police, Eskom, capitalism, unsafe environment 
Xenophobia Gang members, political parties, senior politicians, youth, 
government departments, SA small business associations that are 
threatened by foreign businesses, courts/ judges/ magistrates 
SONA 2015 Securocrats, parliament security agency, parliament presiding officer 
 
6RXWK$IULFDQDFWLYLVWVLQYROYHGLQFRPPXQLW\SURWHVWDOVRNQRZQDVµVHUYLFHGHOLYHU\
SURWHVWV¶ZHUHSULPDULO\WDUJHWLQJWKHLUDFWLYLVPDWYDULRXVOHYHOVRIJRYHUQPHQWDQGIHOWWKH
police were opponents. The key reason given for conflicts was that the government was 
failing to communicate effectively about programmes to help the poor, failing to listen to 
communities in a participatory way about citizen needs and preferences, providing services 
that were too costly, and not adequately delivering services such as water, electricity and 
housing.  With regard to xenophobic violence the inability of poor communities to find voice 
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and access services was similarly mentioned as a key factor. Due to the nature of 
government failures, provincial and national government were mentioned but most of the 
comments about the identity of the main opponent and who was to blame were directed at 
local government. 
Kenyan activists ± although also targeting politicians and criticising the police ± were 
primarily either seeking to influence international bodies such as the International Criminal 
Court or change attitudes ± particularly towards different ethnic and religious groups ± at 
local level through civic education campaigns to overcome the fragmentation in Kenyan 
society, and to inform people about the constitution. When targeting international bodies, 
activism was diversely focussed; for example: 
There were a number of activities like lobbying the European Union, the EU 
Parliament, the UN Security Council and other bodies, to take some... and of course 
the African Union and inter-governmental bodies within Africa concerned with issues 
of peace, security and justice. So we had a number of activities trying to see that 
justice is done for the atrocities that were done. (Kenya Interview 009) 
Like Kenya, Serbian activists also looked to international bodies as a target of their 
campaigns, including the International Criminal Court, NATO and undue or unwelcome 
influence of the EU. For example, activists against the Gay Pride parade identified LGBTI 
rights as a harmful western influence. On the other hand, regarding the 2008 elections, 
Europe was identified as positive by some parties, and political parties who opposed 
European integration were identified as opponents. 
In Kenya and Serbia, ethnic division was often mentioned as a cause of conflict, while 
in Kenya and Egypt religious differences were seen as a key cause of conflict. In Egypt, 
while again the state was a target of activism, the primary problem was identified as religious 
fundamentalism and other key opponents were seen to be the Armed Forces and the Military 
Police, though quite a few respondents focussed on ascribing blame to individuals. For 
example, when asked who was to blame for conflicts Egyptian Interviewee 003 replied: 
The responsibility is a big one and there is no one party to hold it alone. Inside SCAF 
[Supreme Council of Armed Forces], the direct responsibility is with Marshal Tantawy 
as its head, then Sami Anan, then Hamdy Badeen, Ibrahim El Damaty, General 
Ismail Etman and General Emara who justified it after, Marshal or President Abdel 
)DWWDK (O 6LVL ZKDWHYHU KLV SRVLWLRQ QRZ«7KH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ LV ELJ RQH DQG WKH
LGHDRIGLYLGLQJLWLVKDUG«2IFRXUVHWKHUHVSonsibility is clearly on SCAF. 
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Both Kenya and Serbia also specifically blamed the media for ongoing 
democratisation conflicts. In Serbia, for example anti-LGBTI activists identified the media as 
pro-LGBTI, and activists who supported the ombudsman identified the media as playing a 
particular role in trying to bring the ombudsman down. In Kenya, while the literature 
previously revealed the role of the media in propelling the 2007 election violence (Mäkinen 
and Kuira 2008, p.331), in the 2013 elections, the newspapers were accused of not allowing 
fruitful debate to take place, as they tried to focus on consensus and keeping the peace. 
South African activists were the only ones that identified gangs and corporations 
(such as Eskom ± the national electricity provider, Johannesburg Water ± a company 
privatising public water provision, and Servcom ± a financial institution taking over defaulted 
mortgages) as opponents, although both South Africans and Serbians identified 
globalisation/ the global capitalist economic system as a problem. In both instances, global 
economic systems were identified as a hindrance to democracy. 
From this section of the analysis it is clear that across societies there is not one 
source of conflict, no single reason for citizen action, but conflict happens at all levels of 
society from the global level down to local level. From the Serbian examples, it is also clear 
that civil society is not automatically pro-democracy, nor pro-extending human rights to all. 
Some civil society organisations actively seek to limit the rights of others based on religion, 
ethnicity or other distinguishing characteristics such as sexuality.  
Internal and external communication for mobilisation 
Internal mobilisation 
In terms of organising membership, activists in all countries identified landlines and 
cell phones as key communication tools; they also all indicated that email (including email 
mailing lists) were an important way of communicating with membership (Table 3).  
  
24 
 
Table 3. Internal mobilisation tools 
Egypt Christian-Muslim violence Emails, SMS, private Facebook groups, 
petitions 
Maspero democratisation Church podiums, Viber (app), WhatsApp, 
SMS, emails, telephones, door-to-door, bulk 
SMS system, Forum on Religious Liberties, 
distributing printed papers to those who did 
not access social media 
Presidential elections Workshops, church podiums, email, SMS, 
Facebook 
Kenya ICC Questionnaires, phone calls, stakeholder 
meetings, mobile phones 
Somali community Memorandums of understanding, petitions, 
stakeholder meetings, mobile phones, 
emails, bulk messaging service 
Elections Questionnaires, memorandums of 
understanding, petitions, phone calls, 
stakeholder meetings, people's forums, 
mobile phones, emails 
Serbia 2008 Elections Local government structures, meetings, 
telephone, email, email newsletter 
0LORãHYLü ICTY Trial Meetings, telephone, email, petitions 
Ombudsman 2015 Mailing list, newsletter, meetings, petitions 
Pride Parade Mailing list, newsletter, meetings, petitions 
South Africa Community protests Landlines, handwritten letters, pamphlets, 
regular meetings, membership cards, cell 
SKRQHV606DQGµSOHDVHFDOOV¶ ORXGKDLOHU
messenger apps: WhatsApp & Blackberry 
Messenger, email including mailing lists, 
outside resourced person acting as go-
between/messenger, software for sending 
free SMS, workshops 
Xenophobia Workshops, website, specialised 
publications, pamphlets, media, film making, 
social media: Twitter & Facebook, 
networking with other organisations 
SONA 2015 Social media: Twitter & Facebook, public 
meetings, publications and newsletter, 
getting media attention for legal action and 
protests 
 
In Serbia, newsletters and meeting minutes were delivered by electronic mailing lists. 
Kenya, Egypt and South Africa all used cell phone short messaging services (SMS) to 
communicate with their members, including bulk SMS services in Kenya and South Africa, 
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DQGIUHHµSOHDVHFDOOPH¶606VLQ6RXWK$IULFD ,Q6HUELD.HQ\DDQG6RXWK$IULFDKROGLQJ
regular scheduled meetings on a date agreed at the previous meeting was a key way to keep 
communication going, while in all four countries training workshops were also commonly 
used to organise members. 
In Egypt and South Africa messenger services such as WhatsApp, Viber and 
Blackberry Messenger was also a popular internal communication tool. Both South African 
and Egyptian organisations were also either using or developing specific applications (apps) 
for communicating in their networks. For example, a South African NGO working with migrant 
and refugee communities to deal with, among other things, xenophbic violence, stated that 
WKH\ ZHUH LQ µWKH ILQDO VWDJH RI VHWWLQJ XS D PRELOH-based communication system with the 
EURDGHUUHIXJHHDQGPLJUDQWFRPPXQLW\¶6RXWK$IULFDQ,QWHUYLHZ 
Although many organisations across all countries were using communication 
technologies, they were also aware of their limits, and often used less technological methods 
of communication, such as handwritten and hand-delivered letters in Egypt, Kenya and 
South Africa. For example, one South African activists explained how they used written 
letters to mobilise new members: 
Now the way that we did, it was quite basic, we just wrote, hand writing letters and 
just put stamps and we'll go to a settlement and at that particular settlement we'll 
identify the settlement executive committee, then we will just give them the letter and 
request to have a meeting with the executive committee (South African Interview 
005) 
Kenyan activists also commonly used Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), 
questionnaires, and like Egypt and Serbia, petitions to communicate with and rally members. 
In Kenya and Egypt, it was common for civil society organisations to connect with other 
existing structures, such as churches, on the ground. Kenyan and Egyptian organisations 
also used the hierarchy of the organisation as a channel for communication. For example, in 
Kenya: 
We have the national office which is the headquarters for the secretariat, and we 
have regional offices and regional coordinators and field officers and of course they 
have resources that they can reach out to. Like lets in Rift Valley, we split the region 
LQWR WZR 1RUWK 5LIW DQG 6RXWK 5LIW «6R WKH &RXQW\ &RRUGLQDWLQJ &RPPLWWHH LV
responsible for channelling information from the grassroots to the regional office, and 
off course there is feedback. And then the regional office channels the information to 
the head office (Kenya Interview 014) 
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South Africans used a huge variety of communication tools, with ± specifically among 
community-based organisations ± walking up and down in a settlement with a loud hailer 
being a popular tool to call people to meetings. It was also common to use a middle-class 
activist as a go-EHWZHHQ µVZLWFKERDUG¶ ZKHQ FRPPXQLFDWLRQ LQYROYHG VHQGLQJ PHVVDJHV
from one community to another in resource-constrained circumstances. Resource constraints 
were frequently mentioned by South African community activists as limiting their ability to 
communicate with each other; a few Kenyan activists also mentioned similar concerns. 
From these country case studies a clear range of tactics are used across countries ± 
but it stands out that technological tools interact with face-to-face and printed 
communications in unique ways. Neither type of communication stands up to keeping people 
connected on its own connected, but both types of communication have value. 
External mobilisation  
When it comes to communication strategies to mobilise people outside organisational 
membership, there is an explosion of creativity across a wide range of mediums in all four 
countries in the study (Table 4). While most organisations in the study created websites to 
communicate their causes, activists in all four countries also produced special publications 
(such as factual reports, case digests, and newsletters), sent out media briefings and held 
media briefing events, created videos, and distributed pamphlets and/or leaflets. 
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Table 4. Communication tools for external mobilisation 
Egypt Christian-Muslim violence Church sermons, media statements, 
occupying public spaces, framing messages 
Maspero democratisation Video on websites, television, pamphlets, 
sit-ins, demonstrations, issuing statements, 
social media, flags, music, microphones, 
published reports, word of mouth, mobile 
phones 
Presidential elections Infographics, social media 
Kenya ICC Published reports, print media, social media, 
music, art, caravans, public meetings, calls 
for national prayers, SMS, safari.com 
website, media briefings, petitions, emails, 
trained media personalities, training manuals 
Somali community Published reports, publicised hotline, 
working with freelance journalists, 
personalised contact, newspaper pull-outs, 
radio, public forums, SMS including free 
SMS, television, meetings, phone calls, 
journalists, training manuals, calls for 
national prayers, rallies, safari.com website, 
road shows 
Elections Published reports, publicised hotline, 
working with freelance journalists, 
personalised contact, newspaper pull-outs, 
radio, public forums, SMS including free 
SMS, word of mouth and door-to-door, 
theatre, media, church and mosque 
sermons, music, social media, posters, 
leaflets, football matches, art, calls for 
national prayers, safari.com website, press 
conferences, public dialogue, training 
manuals, film showings, People's Daily 
newspaper, workshops, emails, community 
meetings 
Serbia 2008 Elections Website, public events, media appearances, 
protest, door-to-door, direct mailing, 
telephone calls, television, comics, videos, 
street campaigns, public opinion polls, 
questionnaires, brochures, petitions 
0LORãHYLü ICTY Trial Website, specialised publications, books, 
media, t-shirts, educational programmes, 
marches, flags 
Ombudsman 2015 Petitions, open letters, public actions, social 
media 
Pride Parade Public lectures, brochures, media campaign, 
press releases, press conferences, Op-Eds, 
TV programmes, banners, speeches, songs, 
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posters, public debates, social media, 
workshops, special publications, website, 
stands at public events 
South Africa Community protests Regular meetings, loud hailer, protest 
marches and direct action, pamphlets, 
posters, placards, banners, petitions and 
memos, word-of-mouth, door-to-door, 
community newspapers and community 
radio, pirate radio, social media: Facebook, 
Twitter, blogging, email, websites, 
networking with other organisations, phoning 
talk shows, press releases and media 
attention, films, photography, training 
paralegals, workshops, special publications: 
newsletters, reports, briefings, infographics 
etc., hanging washing and underwear in 
public spaces, t-shirts 
Xenophobia Workshops, website, specialised 
publications, pamphlets, media, film making, 
social media: Twitter and Facebook, 
networking with other organisations 
SONA 2015 Social media: Twitter and Facebook, public 
meetings, publications and newsletters, 
getting media attention for legal action and 
protests 
 
Although all organisations in all countries used press statements, some South African 
civil society organisations did not feel confident making statements on their own, and referred 
to press releases made through individual academics who supported them: 
But when it comes to <Steven Marshall>, now and then I know when you do press 
statement also at a Western Cape level, we will call him and just say "Hey, 
<Steven>, this is the press statement that we want to issue - can you just check it 
and okay it as an academic person and as a friend of <CFG> ... he was trusted and I 
think then he would check that press statement and edit and bring it back and said: 
"No okay, there's some changes there that I've made or I've edited somewhere there 
and there," then we relook to it again. Then if it's okay then we will publish and he will 
just approve and it will be published to the entire network of <CFG>. And sometimes 
of course, when we are being criticised at a particular level, you know, then he will 
offer his services to respond to whatever maybe ... whatever critic that was made 
against <CFG> and he will write a response statement to whatever has been issued, 
then before he published that he will quickly then post to us, <CFG>  Western Cape 
so that we go through it and if we are happy with that then he will publish that and it 
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comes as a response from <CFG> Western Cape. Sometime then when we've got 
memos from the City of Cape Town and we will share also that with him, and we'll 
VD\WKDW
VILQHWKH\ZDQWXVWRUHVSRQGWKHQ\HVKHZLOOUHVSRQGWRWKDW«6RXWK
Africa Interview 005) 
Activists in South Africa, Kenya and Serbia explained that press conferences and 
media releases were not always effective: in Serbia and Kenya, activists reported resorting to 
payment to achieve media coverage. A small pro- 0LORãHYLüRUJDQLVDWLRQLQ6HUELDUHSRUWHG
that they were not big enough to organise large rallies, and despite holding multiple press 
conferences and giving written media statements achieved no coverage (Serbia Interview 
015). Similarly, a South African activist reported that they would announce their marches and 
activities via press releases but received no coverage (South Africa Interview 010).  
Going door-to-door was another strategy used across all four countries. For example, 
a Kenya activist explained that in order to support those who had experienced post-election 
violence in 2007, they went door-to-door to talk to the whole community and neighbours in 
order to mobilise them to attend a meeting (Kenya Interview 022). 
In all four countries music and songs were commonly used to mobilise support, as 
was television coverage.  For example, CDs were produced in South Africa. In Kenya, an 
activist explained how in the run up to the 2013 election music and other youth talents were 
seen as a key organising tool (Kenya Interview 004). One Egyptian activist explained how 
the songs used changed over time, especially with regards to putting a stop to religious 
chants and switching to social demands instead (Egypt Interview 001). 
In South Africa, Serbia and Egypt protest marches and occupying spaces were 
commonly used. Some of these actions were planned, but others were spontaneous in 
response to specific events, such as in Egypt where responses to a Muslim attack on a 
Coptic church were quickly organised (Egypt Interview 002). On the other hand, in Serbia 
years of organising went into gaining permission to hold a Gay Pride parade in 2010, as an 
activist described: 
The final wave started with official meetings with the police, somewhere in July, I 
think. In the beginning those meetings, and there were a total of ten or twelve of 
them in the process... In the beginning those meetings happened with two, three or 
four people from the police, mostly in the offices of the Ministry at the Palace of 
Serbia. The moment when, I think it was the end of August, it happened that their 
side was not composed of only three or four men, but that we were taken to a big 
conference room, I think with twenty generals of various police departments, from all 
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of them I think, intervention unit, foreigner unit, traffic police etc., office for protection 
of persons, it was clear to us that the cut was made at the top and that the parade 
would happen, so somewhere, an announcement and a press conference were 
organised, where we announced the date to be somewhere at the start of September 
(Serbia Interview 017) 
Egyptians and South Africans also produced infographics to share information. 
Serbian and Egyptian activists used flags to attract external supporters, while Kenyans and 
South Africans held public meetings and used community radio, petitions, posters, press 
releases and newspaper coverage.  
Religious sermons were commonly used to rally support in Egypt and Kenya, 
although this was not necessarily without contention. For example, an Egyptian activist 
explained how they blocked a priest from preaching at a protest so as to ensure that the 
protest involved people from different religious backgrounds (Egypt Interview 001). 
Organisational t-shirts, banners and newspaper Op-Eds were used in Serbia and 
6RXWK$IULFD$6RXWK$IULFDDFWLYLVWGHVFULEHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIKLVRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VW-shirts as 
they became iconic: resistance to the privatisation of public services came to be identified 
with those wearing them (South Africa Interview 018). 
Other than these over-lapping activities, each country had its own strategies for 
building external support. For example, in Egypt one activist explained how a sit-in grew, by 
asking the few who were there to phone others and get them to participate (Egypt Interview 
003). At sit-ins, creating an open mic in a public space was a common technique to give 
people voice and build common purpose. Egyptian activists also mentioned the importance 
of framing their messages, with a particular focus on eloquence (Egypt Interview 004). 
,Q.HQ\DDFWLYLVWVFDOOHGIRUSXEOLFSUD\HUVFUHDWHGµFDUDYDQV¶JURXSVRISHRSOHZKR
travel around the country picking up followers as they go), held rallies, created hotline 
numbers or free SMS services for people to contact in case of trouble, developed newspaper 
pull-outs, and created drama productions and art. A particular strategy for working with 
communities that had been violent towards each other was to host football matches to allow 
WULEDOµILJKWLQJ¶LQDIXQDQGFRQVWUXFWLYHZD\.HQ\DInterview 005).  But most interventions in 
Kenya involved building up trust over time, and then developing action from there, for 
example with regards to alleviating violence between communities, organisations hold 
meetings with each community culminating in a joint meeting between the conflicted 
communities (Kenya Interview 006). 
31 
 
Serbian civil society organisations held public events, speeches and public debates, 
created comics, held opinion polls, ran educational programmes, and conducted street 
campaigns. South African activists involved in community protests used loud hailers in their 
neighbourhoods, placards at protests, developed pirate radio stations, called in to talk radio 
shows, took and shared photographs (including on social media), and made graffiti and 
murals that lasted many years. One South African activist vividly described how her 
community protested by doing washing in a government building and hanging laundry ± 
including underwear ± in public places to protest their lack of water (South Africa Interview 
004). 
It is clear that communication is a central function of how civil society organisations 
operate across countries. The different types of communication are not limited to mainstream 
and social media, but are creative ± sometimes artistic, and connected to local 
circumstances and local cultures. 
Mediatisation 
Importance of the media 
Different interviewees across countries viewed the importance of the media 
differently, with some activists saying that it was an essential part of modern politics, while 
others said that the media did not speak to the audiences they were trying to reach, so was 
considered marginal. A South African activist said that most people in poor communities did 
not buy newspapers and so they was irrelevant to building a community organisation (South 
Africa Interview 005).  A South African NGO worker agreed that media coverage was not that 
useful due to the juniorisation of newsrooms and the inaccurate coverage. 
However, most activists found media coverage useful. For example, in Serbia, even 
though media coverage of an anti-LGBTI group was mostly unfavourable, the activist 
reflected: 
We, as an organisation, cherished media coverage of any of our political activities. In 
that sense, even negative coverage is still coverage (Serbia interview 12) 
Where organisations desire to provide information to the broad public or mobilise 
citizens, media coverage is considered important. However, if the focus is on movement 
building with people on the ground, media coverage may not serve to strengthen connections 
and media coverage is considered of lesser importance.  
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Procedures for getting media attention 
Civil society organisations in all countries captured media attention by building 
relationships with specific journalists and phoned those journalists when activities were 
taking place or when they wanted to comment on an issue. For example, an Egyptian activist 
described their relationship with the media as follows: 
We also gained the trust of many of them and we even became friends. Some of 
them used to work with us in the radio, they became editor in chiefs. They are also 
aware of the fact that the information we provide is accurate and we are not kidding 
(Egypt interview 010) 
Nevertheless, even with these relationships being built, activists in all countries 
reported that it did not necessarily guarantee media coverage. Some indicated that they did 
not have to contact the media at all, because the media was watching them. A South African 
DFWLYLVWH[SODLQHGKRZZKHQDQLVVXHZDVµKRW¶such as during xenophobic violence, it was 
not necessary to contact the media because the media wanted the stories (South Africa 
interview 014). 
Using press releases and media statements was common in all the countries studied, 
with email typically used to send bulk messages to journalists and editors. However, the 
coverage received from press statements might mean that journalists did not actually attend 
events, but only used the press statement and telephonic interviews to write the story. A 
South African activist said their coverage declined when they started using press releases 
instead of contacting individual journalists directly (South Africa interview 005). Regarding 
these statements, South African and Egyptian activists mentioned a specific focus on framing 
messages in order to attract media attention, sometimes framing messages in ways that did 
not properly draw attention to the issues, for example, a South Africa NGO worker described 
how they framed things in episodic ways, when they would rather have focussed on systemic 
issues (South Africa interview 016). 
In Egypt and South Africa the media sometimes contacted organisations because of 
social media updates they made. In Egypt, such updates were particularly picked up from 
Facebook, while South African activists reported that their tweets were often picked up. 
Press conferences were sometimes held in Serbia and South Africa, with one South African 
activist explained that the venue of a press conference was important; if press conferences 
were held in poor areas, journalists did not attend, whereas they would attend if press 
conferences were held near the city centre (South Africa interview 006). 
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Organisations in South Africa and Serbia reported writing Op-Eds for newspapers. A 
Serbian LGBTI activist explained that they wrote for a daily newspaper once a week, dealing 
with issues of interest to the LGBTI community (Serbia interview 001). Serbian activists also 
reported producing video materials for airing on television, with only a modicum of success 
since they either had to pay for coverage in peak times or accept a non-peak airing schedule 
(Serbia interview 003). In Egypt and South Africa, some organisations created and shared 
infographics with the media in order to attract coverage.  
Particular styles of protest were used in all four countries to attract media attention. 
Some Egyptian protestors reported using drama techniques, while South African activists 
said direct action was essential ± a march on its own was not enough, roads had to be 
blockaded and/or tyres had to be burnt. Another South African activist explained how they 
attended government events to make their opposition clear and to draw media attention to 
themselves rather than the government event journalists were planning to cover (South 
Africa interview 018). 
Both Serbia and Kenyan civil society organisation reported that while their activities 
were occasionally covered for free, they often had to pay for coverage. The most effective 
strategies were often the ones that used a combination of techniques. A South African 
DFWLYLVW UHSRUWLQJ RQ KLV RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V DFWLRQV DURXQG WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V 6WDWH RI WKH 1DWLRQ
address described: 
How we did it, a lot of use of social media. As I said, you know, we tweeted, we kind 
of became a dominant voice in the narrative and on the night through social media, 
we released a very strong statement the next day I think that framed it. We wrote a 
couple of Op-Eds, three or four, and through the public gathering, it gave a sort of 
different angle to the story which is kind of citizens organising to defend democracy 
RXWVLGH RU SDUOLDPHQW DQG WKHQ WKH FRXUW DFWLRQ ZDV MXVW DQRWKHU« ILUVWO\ LW ZDV
another action that can be reported on but secondly by making everyone put things 
into affidavits, the benefit of court action is that you get at least an official story that 
KDV WR KROG VRPH NLQG RI ZHLJKW DQG LI LW GRHVQ¶W LW IDOOV DERXW YHU\ TXLFNO\ 6R LW
brought new facts to the light ± oh, versions of facts (South Africa interview 008) 
Attracting media attention involved a range of techniques in all four countries. 
However, the most newsworthy typically involved actions being taken, with announcements 
being sent to the media before the action took place. Across all countries, some civil society 
organisations reported tremendous difficulty in getting media attention ± particularly 
problematic were Kenya and Serbia where coverage had to be paid for, and South Africa 
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where only organisations that resorted to the destruction of property or similar actions 
achieved media coverage. 
Perceived quality of media coverage 
According to civil society organisations in all four countries in the study, media 
provided superficial coverage, lacking in context and favouring elites. South African activists 
said coverage was episodic, focussing on actions, but not analysing or covering underlying 
issues that led to protest. A Serbian civil society organisation argued that some outlets 
focussed on insignificant matters and blew them up as a way to avoid talking about the 
central issue (Serbia interview 10). Kenyan and South African activists indicated that they did 
not feel that the media gave voice to community issues, but instead focussed titillating stories 
about famous people or the conflicts between elite politicians.  
Egyptian and South African civil society organisations felt that the media was biased, 
often focussing on issues that served their particular agenda, while ignoring key points. 
Some Serbian activists specifically argued that the media was biased towards the state, 
simply actiQJ µDV D OXEULFDQW IRU WKH VWDWH¶V SRVLWLRQ¶ 6HUELD LQWHUYLHZ  +RZHYHU
nationalist Serbian activists argued that one newspaper: 
VSUHDGOLHVDERXW6HUELDQSDWULRWVDQGWKH6HUELDQSHRSOHDVDZKROH ,W LV1$72¶V
propaganda based in Serbia and it is therefore not unusual that you find articles that 
speak about Serbian patriots in a negative context (Serbia interview 016) 
Civil society organisations in Serbia, South Africa and Egypt indicated that the media 
often contained factual inaccuracies and vilified individuals or groups using incorrect 
information. An Egyptian activist described how a journalist had changed the wording of his 
statement to be more inflammatory and refused to correct it. When the activist then withdrew 
the statement the journalist said she would not deal with him again (Egypt interview 002). A 
South African activist was surprised that the media portrayed her as if she was involved in 
xenophobic attacks when instead she had been helping foreign nationals to escape the 
violence (South Africa interview 004). A Serbian activist involved in The Hague trial of 
0LORãHYLüFRPSODLQHGWKDWWKHPHGLDKDUDVVHGKHU³EH\RQGH[WUHPHOHYHOV´6HUELDLQWHUYLHZ
011). With respect to conflict around the Serbian Ombudsman, activists also argued that the 
media deliberately aimed to vilify him (Serbia interview 018). 
The inaccuracies reported by the media could be extremely damaging for the persons 
involved. For example, in Kenya media mixed up people who were victims of violence with 
witnesses in court cases, leading to victims being chased and trailed (Kenya interview 016). 
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Serbian and South African activists also said that the media often quoted activists out 
of context for particular effect. A Serbian activist described how the media cut up what was 
VDLG LQWR µD IHZPHDQLQJOHVVVHQWHQFHVDQG LWappears to the viewers that I am dumb and 
VWXSLG¶6HUELDLQWHUYLHZ 
In Kenya and Serbia, the media was accused of fuelling conflicts and being biased 
due to either ownership by government or a politician. A Serbian activist argued that the 
media stirred emotions between identified sides to ³blur out any kind of rationality to the 
JUHDWHVWH[WHQWSRVVLEOH´6HUELDLQWHUYLHZ Kenyan and Serbian activists also said that 
the media focussed on titillation, not human rights. Kenyan activists also said the media 
vilified refugees and made them appear to be the source of problems, for example 
suggesting that refugees created insecurity in the country to incite hatred (Kenya interview 
017). 
South African activists claimed that they had to do dramatic things to draw attention 
to their issues, and that the media frequently portrayed the poor either as victims, or as 
criminals ± even when they had wide support; the media was not portraying the strong ones 
who were fighting for change in a positive light.  Activists reported that the media frequently 
did not report on events in their communities, especially ignoring police violence, even when 
police shot a boy and people were hospitalised (South Africa interview 21). 
Activists also complained that while there was much coverage of government 
corruption, the media did not do enough to counter it. The media was accused of not 
following up on problems with the criminal justice system such as police arresting activists at 
protests but then later dropping the charges. Community organisations also reported that 
journalists stand with the police at a distance from an event and do not talk to protestors. 
Activists indicated that NGO organisations were able to gain more favourable coverage than 
community organisations but even then there were problems, such as the media conflating 
migrants with refugees. 
In Serbia, civil society organisations argued that the media covered every banal 
conflict as if it was the apocalypse and in the case of the ombudsman conflict, created a trial 
by the media. Some organisations also accused the media of being pro-European, while 
others suggested that media coverage has disintegrated into tabloidism, stirring up emotion 
and obscuring rationality. 
Both Kenyan and Egyptian civil society organisations reported media black outs on 
some issues. For example, an Egyptian Coptic organisation indicated that only Coptic media 
covered their issues, while public media:  
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does not interact with us on any level, even when we talk about the details of a 
certain case. For example, the latest updates on the videos that we presented in the 
case were the creation a committee from Egyptian TV to examine the videos. This 
committee reached a conclusion that stated the validity of these videos and that they 
had not been tampered with. This in turn strengthened our situation in the case, yet 
this was not covered (Egypt interview 012) 
Across countries, few activists were happy with the media coverage they received, so 
even when they overcame barriers to getting any coverage at all, the issues they were 
fighting about were generally not conveyed to newspaper audiences. This is not surprising 
given that other studies have found that while protest movements typically need media to 
DFKLHYHSURWHVWJRDOV³VXFKFRYHUDJHPD\QRWbe forthcoming unless protesters engage in 
dramatic and even violent action. However, those very actions that attract media attention 
DUHRIWHQFHQWUDOIHDWXUHVRIVWRULHVWKDWGHOHJLWLPLVHWKHSURWHVWHUV´(Boyle et al. 2012, p.4). 
In unequal societies where the legacies of both past and present neoliberal policy choices 
combine to limit the choices for full citizenship for many, protest action by the marginalised is 
often framed by the (mainstream) media as irrational and illegitimate, and the voices which 
GRPLQDWHWKHVHIUDPHVDUHµOHJLWLPDWH¶YRLFHVRIWKHHOLWHVZLWKLQµRIILFLDO¶FLUFOHV 
Importance and role of social media 
Social media had a role to play in all four countries. For example, in a Serbian 
organisation defending the ombudsman from a media attack, the strategy was to point out 
instances where journalists were not professional and violated ethical codes to boost the 
information available to the public via social media. However, even though many South 
African organisations used social media and the internet, some reported that they barely 
used their social media accounts because internet access was expensive and poor citizens 
did not have money to purchase data. 
In the study, Egyptians most commonly emphasised social media and news channels 
as a tool for internal mobilisation. In particular many organisations had a Facebook page with 
a restricted membership and organisations were not afraid to announce their activities on 
FKDQQHOV VXFK DV $O -D]HHUD 2QH (J\SWLDQ LQWHUYLHZHH VDLG µVRFLDO Pedia was the most 
LPSRUWDQWWKLQJ«WKLVEURXJKWWKHSHRSOH¶ (Egypt Interview 001). Many Egyptian civil society 
organisations also used Facebook to publish information that would otherwise have been 
difficult to disseminate, to post event invitations and announcements in order to gain 
participants, or to collect donations towards a specific cause or activity. Facebook was also 
used as a space for discussing concerns and establishing a variety of opinions on an issue. 
However, while social media was often reported as building organisations, the relationship 
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was not always straightforward. For example, one Egyptian activist reported that social 
media helped both to build and to demolish the organisation, as internal disagreements were 
aired on their Facebook paJHWKDWKDGµOLNHV¶(J\SWLQWHUYLHZ 
Several South African activists also reflected on the limitations of social media for 
political organising, in terms of reach and types of information people respond to on social 
media: people respond to posts on new haircuts or shoes, but not to those on politically 
important topics. Where South African activists were using social media, they felt it was a 
useful way to acquire support and ideas for tackling problems, as activists from other 
communities would connect and share their experiences and suggestions; this also built 
important relationships (South Africa interview 009). In South Africa, civil society 
organisations also use a petition app ± amandla.mobi ± developed for civil society to build 
support around specific campaigns of public interest (South Africa interview 021). The 
petitions are circulated on social media and signatures collected by clicking on a link from a 
social media site.  
Serbian activists also reported running campaigns on social media as a key way to 
build support, to share accurate information and to highlight services such as hotlines that 
people could call for help. 
In Kenya, while civil society organisations reported using social media to share 
information that the mainstream media was not reporting, some organisations did not see it 
as hugely important due to limited numbers of Kenyans using social media; social media did 
not have enough reach (Kenya interview 001). While other Kenyan civil society organisations 
were more positive, indicating that it creates a space for dialogue between different members 
of society ± particularly young people, one activist felt that had social media been available 
during the 2007 election violence, it could have aggravated problems further as it would have 
been more difficult to contain statements inciting violence (Kenya interview 007). Another 
activist argued that, due to the lack of controls, social media could be a space for spreading 
hate speech and misinformation (Kenya interview 010). However, even when social media 
was full of violent speech, it did not necessarily lead to violence: one activist suggested that 
though violent speech happened during the 2013 elections, with Kenyan social media 
³EDVLFDOO\RQILUH´LWGLGQRWVSLOORYHULQWR physical violence (Kenya interview 013). Instead, in 
Kenya, Twitter was seen as a key way to spread news instantly, in a way that mainstream 
media could not (Kenya interview 025). 
Activists in all four countries indicated that social media was useful for making contact 
with journalists. Civil society organisations indicated that journalists often followed them on 
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social media, so that when they released reports or invitations via social media, journalists 
would contact them for comments. 
Across countries, social media was increasing in importance but among civil society 
organisations in Kenya and South Africa there was still a lot of scepticism about the reach of 
this medium. While the impact of social media was clear in the Egyptian example, civil 
society organisations in other countries had not yet achieved such broad impact using social 
media. Activists in Kenya, South Africa and Serbia felt that it could be a useful tool in building 
specific campaigns, but very few activists in those countries were social media champions. 
Perceptions of democracy 
Civil society organisations in all four countries reported that corruption was a limit on 
democracy, but corruption was cited by relatively few activists in each country.  
One Egyptian activist mentioned corruption with frustration: 
We see the corrupt current growing and growing. Who would think that a revolution 
emerges and then another one two years later, and the entire people is on the street, 
and the result is more corruption?! Who would think that an environment with 
coexistence between everyone is near? This is very hard (Egypt interview 004) 
In Kenya some activists argued that corruption and election rigging go hand-in-hand, 
while a South African activist linked corruption not just to financial irregularities, but the 
pervasive ill treatment of women in politics ± including in civil society organisations ± with 
WUDGLQJRISRZHUIRUVH[EHLQJ³HQGHPLF´(South Africa interview 021). 
In Kenya and South Africa activists said police brutality was common, for example, 
one South African activist reported that police had repeatedly killed activists. In Egypt, it was 
the military ± not the police ± who were seen as a hindrance to democracy, and an Egyptian 
activist reported that the military council takes advantage of tools such as social media, by 
placing people in particular conflicts in order to cast doubt on what was otherwise being 
reported (Egypt interview 013). 
In Kenya and South Africa, poor communities had difficulty accessing the legal 
system and, while both countries had good constitutions, legislation was not being properly 
implemented which had a negative impact on democracy.  A Kenyan activist argued that 
GHVSLWHWKHFRXQWU\¶VSURJUHVVLYHFRQVWLWXWLRQSROLWLFDOUROHSOD\HUVZHUH³VWLOOJUDSSOLQJZLWK
implHPHQWDWLRQ´DQGXQWLOODZVZHUHWUDQVODWHGLQWRSUDFWLFHHOHFWLRQVZRXOGDOZD\VKDYHWKH
potential to spill over into violence (Kenya interview 002). 
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A key limit on democracy in Egypt, Kenya and Serbia was that religious differences 
were expressed violently and the perpetrators of violence were not held to account.  
However, a Kenyan activist did not see an end to such polarisation due to the language 
against terrorism, which suggests that torture or hanging those accused of being part of Al-
Shabaab is acceptable (Kenya interview 013). 
Egyptian activists said that Copts have no rights in the country as Egypt is not a 
secular state. But one activist in Egypt argued that the polarisation and division has 
decreased, while dissatisfaction with government had increased (Egypt interview 009). 
Regardless of this, more than in any other country under study, Egyptian activists pointed to 
the dangers of being part of a civil society organisation stating that one could be attacked 
despite not having spoken out, or accused of being a collaborator simply for accepting 
international funding (Egypt interview 013). 
%\FRQWUDVWRQH.HQ\DQDFWLYLVWDUJXHGWKDWZKLOHWKHUHZHUHµWHHWKLQJSUREOHPV¶ZLWK
democracy, people were now able to be more expressive and discuss problems (Kenya 
interview 009). However some Kenyan activists did not consider elections to be credible and 
said there was a lack of transparency and accountability in government. Kenyan civil society 
organisations also considered fragmentation and ethnic differences damaging to democracy 
in Kenya.  
Activists felt that the poor enforcement of socio-economic rights and poverty hindered 
democracy in South Africa, as did poor labour standards.  One activist argued that for as 
long as people were without access to public services such as running water and sanitation, 
democracy would be skewed and unwholesome (South Africa interview 022). Many South 
African activists felt that the poor were ignored, with politicians living in luxury and forgetting 
the disadvantaged. Many activists also suggested that the conception of democracy at 
community level was substantially different to the kind of democracy espoused by the media, 
in that the media focussed on elections and voting, whereas communities sought a much 
more participator\ GHPRFUDF\ ZLWK ³PHDQLQJIXO HQJDJHPHQW ZLWKLQ LQ JRYHUQPHQW DQG
community-based organisations, before they can do whatever policies, or even doing the 
EXGJHW´ (South Africa interview 009). 
In Serbia, activists and civil society organisations suggested there was still a level of 
authoritarianism in the country, with weak institutions not able to safeguard democracy. 
Others argued that Serbia was democratic as the internet showed a wide range of 
perspectives being shared on many issues. Some Serbian organisations suggested that a 
western model of democracy was being imposed from the outside and that voters were easy 
to manipulate through the media. Several respondents felt that the media was not 
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LQGHSHQGHQWHQRXJKDQGVWLOOVHHPHGOLNHD³UHJLPHPHGLDLQVRme communist state where 
RQO\ FHUWDLQ WKLQJVDUH UHSRUWHGRQ´ DVRQO\SRVLWLYH LQIRUPDWLRQZDVDYDLODEOH UDWKHU WKDQ
stories on corruption and the misuse of public functions (Serbia interview 007). 
In Kenya, Serbia and South Africa, some activists felt that their country had achieved 
democracy, but still had a number of problems to resolve. However, in all four countries 
some activists argued that democracy had not really been achieved as many citizens were 
still voiceless or could not sufficiently access their rights. The activists who were unhappy 
with the state of democracy often linked this to media coverage, where they felt that those 
actively engaged in tackling democratic problems were given no coverage or negative 
coverage. This lack of coverage or negative coverage meant that the political lives of 
activists and civil society organisations were often not given a meaningful place in 
contributing to enhanced democracy in the four countries in the study. 
Discussion 
The democratic contestations in this study show marked similarities with the literature 
on civil society organisations: in all country organisations saw themselves playing a key role 
in challenging their respective governments to do better. Our discussion explores the shape 
of civil society in the case studies in relation to three areas: citizenship and collective 
identities; the control and distribution of power; and electoral conflicts. 
Citizenship and collective identities 
Across Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa, the relationship between civil society 
and the media raises overlapping concerns. Ethnic or religious tension was a feature of the 
chosen case studies in all four countries, with identity significantly linked to perceptions about 
the meaning of citizenship and to broad political-geographic entities. For example, in Serbia 
religious identity was often entangled with ideas about what it means to be Serbian and 
whether or not a European identity can be ascribed to Serbians. In Egypt the Coptic religion 
held that it was an ancient Egyptian tradition in conflict with the current predominance of 
Islam in the country. Kenya was marked by ethnic and religious conflict, with a huge rage of 
HWKQLFLWLHV GHWHUPLQLQJ FLYLO VRFLHW\¶V DFFHVV WR UHVRXUFHV DQG ZLWK ,VODPLF .HQ\DQV DQG
Somali migrants being seen as a source of terrorism. Xenophobia in South Africa saw South 
Africans pitting themselves again Africans from elsewhere in the continent, with some parts 
of civil society asserting an African identity in response to xenophobia, while others 
underscored their South African specificity; this conflict was linked to who has the rights and 
ability to access housing, education and other services. Despite the marks of identity politics, 
in the South African xenophobic conflict, identity politics was not identified as a key 
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hindrance to democracy ± even xenophobic violence was largely attributed to poverty and 
access to public services such as housing, water, electricity, education and health care. 
Nevertheless, such ethnic and religious conflicts point to civil societies in new 
democracies grappling with notions of a national identity or even a continental identity, with 
some parts of civil society wanting to draw geographic identity borders rather narrowly, while 
others wanting national identities to be more inclusive. This offers a markedly different view 
on civil society to that which is commonly held regarding western democracies: civil society is 
not just about citizens challenging the state (political activism) or challenging a particular 
issue (such as environmental issues or gender issues), but is an activism of belonging, 
exploring who is in and who is out, who is fully a citizen, a member of the nation, and who 
can be discredited?  These conflicts can be viewed as being not so much about democracy 
but instead how far citizenship or nationhood extends. 
In all four countries, contestation around identity led to violence, or what we 
SUHYLRXVO\FDOOHGµXQFLYLOVRFLHW\¶9LROHQFHLQWHUPVRINLOOLQJWKRVHZLWKGLIIHUHQWHWKQLFDQGRU
religious backgrounds featured in Egypt, South Africa and Kenya; civil society organisations 
in all three countries tended to see themselves as limiting such violence and alleviating 
tension. In Serbia, violence was marginally less serious, with thuggery but not killing being 
ZLWQHVVHG DURXQG WKH /*%7, SURWHVWV 3URSHUW\ GHVWUXFWLRQ ZDV DQRWKHU IHDWXUH RI µXQFLYLO
VRFLHW\¶ LQ(J\SWDQG6RXWK$IULFD)RUH[DPSOHLQ(J\SW&RSW&KXUFKHVZHUHEXUQHGDQG
Copts were killed, whereas burning in South Africa tended to be more symbolic ± burning 
tyres (and where buildings in South Africa were burned by protestors, they tended to be 
public buildings perceived to provide inferior service). The burnings of churches in Egypt 
were seen as part of a range of repressions against Copts, but in South Africa, the discourse 
around burning tended to focus on its communicative aspect ± it was used as a language to 
tell outsiders how fed up and angry a particular community was. 
7KHPHGLD¶VUROHLQDOOHYLDWLQJRULQIODPLQJHWKQLFDQGUHOLJLRXV conflict was a specific 
concern of the civil society organisations interviewed in this study. In Kenya and Egypt the 
PHGLD¶V IDLOLQJV ZLWK UHJDUG WR GHPRFUDF\ ZHUH SDUWLFXODUO\ PDUNHG LQ WHUPV RI µLGHQWLW\
SROLWLFV¶ZKHUH UHOLJLRXVDQGHWKQLFFRQIOLFWZHre seen as a primary obstacle to stability. In 
these countries, activists felt that the media could do more to build dialogue and create 
societies in which there was increased room for difference. For example, Egyptian activists 
reflected on the need for a secular state, while Kenyan activists felt that the media should 
broker a message that focussed on citizen rights for all, regardless of ethnic or religious 
identity.  
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The media picture in Serbia was not quite as clear-cut with both nationalist and 
eurocentric civil society organisations pointing to media bias, albeit in different media 
organisations. LGBTI groups felt that although the media was initially resistant to affirming 
messages about rights, once the government conceded to the Pride Parade, the media was 
open to regular Op-Eds from the LGBTI community. On the other hand, nationalist groups 
tended to see the media as importing eurocentric ideas, such as LGBTI rights, and the ICTY 
WULEXQDORI6ORERGDQ0LORãHYLü 
Control and distribution of power 
'HVSLWHWKHDFWLRQVRIµXQFLYLOVRFLHW\¶WKHSRZHUWREHYLROHQWZDVQRWRQO\GLVWULEXWHG 
among civil society organisations. Governments endorsed ± particularly through the police or 
military forces ± violence around protests, the criminalisation of protestors, and through 
inaction, allowed xenophobic violence in South Africa and violence against Copts in Egypt. 
In terms of the power to bring about positive change, the perceived leverage point 
was viewed differently in the four countries. While in Serbia, South Africa and Egypt, civil 
society directed significant energy into contesting the state, state power, and the form of 
governance institutions, in Kenya civil society instead saw its role as building citizen 
awareness of their rights. In this sense Serbian, South African and Egyptian activism can be 
seen to fit into the western model of political activism ± contesting the state. Although 
activism in Kenya is citizenship-oriented, it is not so much ths as educating citizens into an 
idealised role and rights, under the assumption of an idealised state and governance system. 
Since the locus of power is conceived differently in Kenya to the other countries, the 
presumed point of leverage in Kenya is through building a share citizenship, thus affirming 
that the power to live peacefully lies with ordinary people. Therefore, while Serbia, South 
Africa and Egypt were rich in protest cultures, civil society in Kenya instead devoted 
significant energy to educational events and unity building (e.g. workshops, themed caravans 
of people travelling cross-country to share specific messages). Kenyan organisations also 
tended to be more formal. Limited resources outside formal structures meant that broad 
communication tended to happen by spreading messages to key persons via SMS, who then 
passed on messages locally within their own networks by word of mouth. 
Despite the different conceptions of power, Egypt, Serbia and South Africa all placed 
significant importance on networked civil society with civil society organisations as hubs of 
activity around which citizens could gather, and thus claim considerable power for their 
activities. In civil society organisations, therefore, communication was a key way to sustain 
themselves as hubs of power. As such, there were common internal communication activities 
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across countries, all designed to maintain close connections between core members, so as 
to strengthen and claim power.  
Unsurprisingly, meetings were a common communication tool of all civil society 
organisations in this study. In Egypt, a significant proportion of communication was taking 
place in open or closed Facebook groups, but for those who were not connected to the 
internet, pamphleteering was another common communication tool, as were messaging 
services such as Viber. Serbian organisations tended to communicate outside meetings 
through emails or email mailing lists. Internal communication across civil society 
organisations in South Africa was hugely varied, depending on the level of formality, access 
to resources, and geographic spread: more formal, well-resourced organisations tended to 
use email mailing lists, messaging services such as WhatsApp and BBM, and formal printed 
publications such as pamphlets, newsletters, inforgraphics and reports; however, community-
based organisations tended to have poor internet access and limited resources so word of 
mouth, going door-to-door and walking among houses with a loud hailer to call people to 
meetings was much more common. Despite the variations, civil society organisations tended 
to use as many internal communication tools as they could access if they were perceived to 
be useful in sustaining their support base. 
The power of civil society organisations also depended on their ability to attract new 
supporters and external communication was essential to maintaining power in the 
organisation. Through external communication, civil society builds their organisations, 
attracts members and gains supporters. Communication is therefore a key to redistributing 
power from governments to civil society in all countries in this study. Civil society 
organisations were immensely creative in putting various communication tools to good use, 
in order to influence the public discourses around key issues. The huge variety of methods 
used to communicate, included both mainstream media contact and self-made 
communication in various mediums.  
Common communication techniques/ mediums used across all countries included 
organisational websites, specific publications, music and songs, social media, and 
consensus-building public events such as workshops, debates and dialogues. Egyptian civil 
society was the most celebratory of the potential of social media. In Kenya, Serbia and South 
Africa while activists used social media, sometimes to good effect, there were not as many 
social media activist champions as there were in Egypt. Activists in Kenya, Serbia and South 
Africa agreed social media had some positive political spin-offs but Kenyan activists were 
cautious in terms of the potential for spreading hate speech via social media, and South 
African activists were sceptical of the reach of social media into poor communities. 
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Traditional methods of building solidarity remained at the forefront of organisation-
building across all four countries. In Serbia, Egypt and South Africa activists occupied public 
spaces (public squares and buildings in all three countries, as well as public roads in South 
Africa), and within these occupied spaces creativity thrived with, for example, open mic 
sessions in Egypt and public clothes washing in South Africa. Individual countries also had a 
large range of activities that were locally specific, for example football matches and drama 
productions in Kenya, integration of messages into religious sermons in Egypt, graffiti and 
pirate radio in South Africa, and comics and opinion polls in Serbia. Communication 
strategies are integral to the function of civil society organisations and how political impact is 
strategised as it is the backbone of political engagement and contestation. All the activists 
interviewed had put in significant work and paid substantial attention to communication 
strategies, sometimes through their own efforts and sometimes incorporating mainstream 
media strategies. 
Although the mainstream media was considered an important role player in the way it 
distributes power to political actors in society, some activists felt that it was far more 
important to concentrate communication efforts on organising and strengthening local 
connections (as in community organisations in South Africa) or on building local consensus 
(such as the dialogues hosted in Kenya to work out ethnic differences).  Therefore, within 
countries there was a spectrum of importance placed on the media, with some civil society 
organisations primarily measuring their success in terms of media attention received, while 
others saw it as a distraction from the key issue of communicating with stakeholders. 
Nevertheless in all four countries, civil society organisations indicated that the media 
was not an effective tool for redistributing power in society. The media were seen as not 
doing enough to cover issues raised by civil society. Instead, civil society organisations felt 
that the mainstream media focussed on dynamics between ruling elites, and only provided 
superficial coverage of conflict that did not fall neatly into the political party conception of 
politics. Furthermore, in Serbia, South Africa and Egypt activists argued that the media had 
deliberately distorted what they had said for dramatic effect or to vilify certain activists, rather 
than portraying civil society organisations as key role players in the political environment.  
In South Africa, both NGOs and community based organisations indicated that 
DOWKRXJKSRYHUW\ZDVDNH\LVVXHLQWKHFRXQWU\LIWKHPHGLDFRYHUHGSRRUSHRSOH¶VLVVXHVDW
all, it was in terms of action they had taken with no analysis of why action had taken place. 
The lack of visibility of poor people in the media contributed to the many other forms of 
silencing that experienced by the poor. Kenyan activists felt that the media was frivolous and 
focussed on trivia, such as the social lives of the elite, rather than on issues of national 
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importance and so did not play a significant role in improving the power relations between 
government elites and citizens. Serbian civil society organisations felt that media coverage 
had disintegrated into tabloidism, stirring up emotion with no analysis, and therefore 
inflaming tensions rather than alleviating them. In Egypt, civil society activists felt that the 
media was deliberately inciting conflict by editing to create controversy, instead of building 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ$FURVVDOO IRXUFRXQWULHVDFWLYLVWVZHUHKLJKO\FULWLFDORI WKHPHGLD¶V UROH LQ
building and shaping democracy and challenging power relations, particularly in terms of not 
doing enough to raise alternative voices and focussing instead on the activities and voices of 
elites. 
Serbia and Kenya had particular problems in that civil society organisations were 
sometimes required to pay for media attention, even if the information was of general public 
interest. In South Africa, while NGOs felt able to get media coverage with newsworthy 
information, community-based organisations experienced significant difficulty in attracting 
media attention, with many reporting that they deliberately escalated violence to gain media 
coverage. Media in Egypt seemed particularly partisan with, for example, Copt-aligned 
newspapers providing coverage for Coptic organisations while other media houses totally 
ignored them. Kenyan organisations also reported media blackouts in the 2013 elections ± 
since media was blamed for the violence after the 2007 elections, the media appeared 
reluctant to report on ethnic violence in 2013, in case it incited a further spread of violence.  
Electoral conflicts 
While electoral conflicts were a key aspect of case studies in Egypt, Kenya and 
Serbia, the unequal distribution of wealth and services in South Africa was seen as the key 
driver of conflict and it was felt that the media did not do enough to examine this source of 
conflict. In addition, activists remarked that the South African media had a liberal, election-
based notion of democracy, whereas most activists were more interested in building local, 
participatory, direct democracy. In South Africa, then, elections were almost a distraction to 
the work of building locally rooted democracy. 
By contrast, in Kenya, regular elections and an inclusive constitution were seen as 
significant steps towards building democracy, although there was a tension between 
devolving and decentralising power to local levels, and building a national identity. Civil 
society organisations in Kenya devoted significant energy to communicating in order to 
maintain peaceful relationships between different groups in Kenyan society, and to ensure 
that elections took place without violence. Civil society organisations felt that the media was 
not doing enough to strike a balance in election coverage ± having in 2007 been partly 
responsible for inciting violence, in the 2013 elections the media virtually shut down debate 
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for fear of inflaming ethnic tensions. Because of the failing of the mainstream media in 2013, 
FLWL]HQVXVHGVRFLDOPHGLDWRGHEDWHLVVXHVDQGZKLOHWKLVVSDFHZDVGHVFULEHGDV³KRW´WKH
heat did not spill over into significant violence. Instead social media was a space to air 
tensions without the need to act violently. 
On all sides of Serbian civil society, the elections were seen as key political moments 
for civil society to either build consensus around particular positions (pro-European 
democracy or not) or to simply encourage others to vote. Some civil society organisations 
played significant roles in terms of encouraging people across the spectrum to vote. The 
media was perceived positively by several pro-European civil society organisations in terms 
of the 2008 elections for covering debates between nationalists and the pro-European lobby, 
with the pro-European lobby ultimately achieving a decisive victory. However, nationalists felt 
that the coverage was biased and the media had become prone to European influence. 
There was significant polarisation in Egypt and the elections were not seen as a 
panacea for democracy however, the autocratic, military state suspicious of civil society 
meant that Egyptians were least likely, of those included in the study, to see the fruits of 
democracy. 
Conclusion 
Alongside regular elections, the existence of civil society, and its representation in the media, 
were not necessarily seen as enough to guarantee stable democracies. Civil society 
organisations in all four countries in the study are lively and vibrant, deploying a range of 
tactics and communication techniques to contest political space at national and local levels. 
While in all countries, the media provided some space and coverage of civil society activities, 
organisations in all countries felt that the media often played a detrimental role in supporting 
democracy, either by superficial coverage of key issues, or by flagrantly highlighting conflict 
in a way that increased polarisation. In all the countries in the study, civil society 
organisations indicated that media attention was focussed far more on elites than it was on 
examining the important work civil society organisations were doing to create peaceful and 
equitable societies. 
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